# 1NC

## Offcase

### 1NC

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### Anticompetitive’ behavior are business practices that restrict competition without providing lower cost or higher quality goods and services

OECD 3 – OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, from the Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3145

Definition:

Anticompetitive practices refer to a wide range of business practices in which a firm or group of firms may engage in order to restrict inter-firm competition to maintain or increase their relative market position and profits without necessarily providing goods and services at a lower cost or of higher quality.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### Violation---the affirmative doesn’t defend prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### The impact is clash---debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics---they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world---this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible---clash is an intrinsic good and it’s vital to the overall practice of debate. Every debater is here for different reasons, but they trace back to the pedagogical uniqueness of the space. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

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#### They neoliberalize difference by theorizing identities as essentially different and in competition for recognition. The only way out of oppression inflicted by specific systems is striving for solidarity to amplify class consciousness.

Bruce Rogers-Vaughn 16, Associate Professor of the Practice of Pastoral Theology and Counseling at Vanderbilt Divinity School, “Muting and Mutating Suffering: Sexism, Racism, and Class Struggle,” Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, pg 131-166

INTERSECTIONALITY AS A POST-CAPITALIST THEORY: THE INTER-RELATIONALITY OF SUFFERING In light of the foregoing discussions of the neoliberal alterations of sexism, racism, and class conflict, I propose that we understand intersectionality theory as a post-capitalist project. This is not a stretch, given its origin among 1970s feminists who were themselves quite critical of capitalism. This requires, however, careful attention to the radical impulse within intersectionality theory and a dedicated precision regarding terminology. Otherwise, as I have already noted, it can quite easily be co-opted by neoliberal versions of diversity and multiculturalism. I will make no effort to be exhaustive in this concluding section. Rather, I draw upon prior sections of this chapter to suggest, in summary fashion, five features of an intersectionality theory that help to preserve its post-capitalist spirit. In brief, a post-capitalist intersectionality theory: (a) is primarily concerned with understanding the social generation of suffering rather than individual identity formation; (b) emphasizes a material grounding in actual human relationships rather than intersections between abstract categories of difference; (c) refuses to ontologize or prioritize the differences that appear in relationships; (d) strives to establish solidarities rather than dwelling solely upon the recognition of difference; and (e) works toward an increase in consciousness that addresses both second- and third-order suffering. As for the first point, I have the impression that intersectionality theory, despite its original countercultural impetus, is often read superficially as first and foremost a discourse about identity formation and cultural difference. The isolated individualism of neoliberal rationality, furthermore, tends to interpret identity as simply a matter of personal choice or individual formation. The combination of these two moves robs intersectionality theory of its radical critique. This can have unfortunate real life consequences. For example, psychologists Grzanka and Miles ( 2016 ), after studying the literature and training videos for “LGBT Affirmative Therapy,” conclude that this psychotherapy training program reconceives intersectionality simply as a matter of “multiple identities.” They argue that this is an instance of the “multicultural turn” in psychology, elements of which “are actually consonant with neoliberal transformations of social and institutional life that foremost function to incorporate difference, rather than to redirect and reconfigure the ways power and material resources are unfairly distributed” (emphasis in original). 4 They conclude that, while this form of therapy should not be seen as “fundamentally neoliberal,” it is co-opted by a neoliberal agenda that ignores structural inequalities and shifts responsibility onto individual agents. The result, as we will see in the next chapter, is that individuals may blame themselves and remain unaware of the social–material origins of their distress. The overriding concern of intersectionality, however, is not identity but the suffering arising from systemic oppression. It is a theory about the social genesis of suffering more than it is an identity theory. In her overview of intersectionality theory, pastoral theologian Nancy Ramsay ( 2014 ) observes that social justice is “the normative goal in intersectionality” (p. 456). This means that, while it may indeed shed light on questions regarding identity, its main concern is social well-being. The statement of the Combahee River Collective ( 1977 /1979), for example, focuses on social systems of oppression. The intersections the authors envision are not between identities as such. In the initial paragraph, they note that their analyses and practices are “based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking ” (p. 362, my emphasis). The spirit of this document is preserved in bell hooks’s ( 2004 ) recurrent description of contemporary oppressions as emanating from “imperialist white-supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (p. 17). 5 Unlike many of the lists common in the intersectionality literature—race, class, gender, sexuality, and so on—the culprits here are systems rather than identity categories. Furthermore, the concern here is laser-focused on suffering . Oppression is accomplished, however, by both configuring identities and manipulating the power dynamics circulating around and through them. The black feminists who wrote the Combahee River Collective statement believed that, while racism, sexism, and heterosexism cannot be reduced to class conflict, neither can the oppressions around these identities be understood without comprehending their place in capitalist systems of production. For our purposes here, it is critical to remember that neoliberal rationality is perfectly capable of co-opting intersectional discourse, primarily by reemploying the economics/culture divide I have previously discussed in this book. This has become evident during the 2016 presidential campaigns in the USA, in which the problems of racism and sexism are often discussed without reference to class struggle. As Denvir ( 2016 ) has observed, such injustices “cease to be intersectional the moment they are abstracted from political economy” (para. 7). Speaking of abstraction, those who espouse a post-capitalist intersectionality, which is to say, a version of this theory that retains its historical origins, will have reservations about this designation. This brings us to the second feature of a post-capitalist intersectionality. The term “intersectionality” is highly conceptual and immaterial. On its face, it appears to conjure up a mental exercise in which abstract categories of difference, rather than actual people, are interrelated. Worse yet, it could be taken to imply—contrary to its original principles—that these are categories of essential difference that are first separate, with the challenge being how to theorize their points of contact. In addition to leaving aside considerations of class, this is precisely what neoliberalized forms of intersectionality tend to do. The neoliberal imagination conceives societies as aggregates of distinctive and separate-but-equal individuals. The intellectual problem is then how to explain the ways these individual building blocks intersect. Perhaps, then, we need a better word for theorizing the sufferings emerging around social differences. It is generally accepted that the term intersectionality first appeared in a paper by the legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw ( 1989 ). Thus neither the term “intersectionality” nor any of its derivatives appears in the statement of the Combahee River Collective ( 1977 /1979). Rather, the document consistently refers to human relationships . Markers of difference (identities) are understood as entangled in the dynamics of everyday relationships, not only between individuals but also between individuals and social systems, as well as between collectives. Womanist theologian and ethicist emilie townes (personal communication, January 19, 2016) suggests that a better term might be inter-relationality . In my view, this means that the differences suffusing actual relationships, and the sufferings that often originate in them, are embedded in the materiality of relationships. They appear as we relate in concrete ways—eating together, living together, working together—including the ways we collaborate within and among collectives, as well as how we construct the economics and policies of social life. From this perspective, identities are always formed in relationships. They may be healthy or unhealthy, just or unjust, or combinations thereof. But they are never simply “personal choices.” Thus Ramsay ( 2014 ) observes: “Intersectional approaches to identity clearly link individual and social dimensions to any experience of identity. Identity is socially and historically constructed” (p. 456). The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman ( 2004 ) adds that identity “cannot be formed unless in reference to the bonds connecting the self to other people and the assumption that such bonds are reliable and stable over time” (p. 68). In more just relationships and societies, individuals have enough liberty to improvise upon what is given to them, and identities remain flexible. In less just societies, identities are simply imposed and rigid. I have been claiming that neoliberal transformations of sexism and racism refer to identity categories that are shorn of class. This may be a good place to comment on the connection, within an inter-relational perspective, between class and other identities. In a previous publication, I have argued that class is not an identity (Rogers-Vaughn, 2015 ). I must now repent of that opinion. At the time, I was focused on the difference between class and identity as this term is understood within neoliberal identity politics. Inter-relationality, however, gives us a way to understand identity, and even identity politics, from outside neoliberal discourse. Class, of course, has to be amenable to identification. Otherwise there could be no “class consciousness,” as well as forms of solidarity and social movements founded upon it. I still claim, however, that class is “a different kind of difference.” As theologian Joerg Rieger ( 2013 ) has noted, to talk about inclusion or diversity with regard to class, as we might with gender and race, makes little sense (p. 199). For instance, applying affirmative action to gender and race leads to a more equitable society. If applied to class differences, however, “it would mean the end of capitalism” (p. 202). What I wish to add here is that the economic and political power differentials indicated by the term class are not simply the basis for a potential identity. More importantly, class power manifests the capacity to generate and reconfigure identities, including those attributed to sex, gender, and race. For example, the ability to have an identity, much less multiple identities, as well as the degree of agency to improvise upon identity varies with class power. Bauman ( 2004 ) summarizes this capacity: At one pole of the emergent global hierarchy are those who can compose and decompose their identities more or less at will, drawing from the uncommonly large, planet-wide pool of offers. At the other pole are crowded those whose access to identity choice has been barred, people who are given no say in deciding their preferences and who in the end are burdened with identities enforced and imposed by others ; identities which they themselves resent but are not allowed to shed and cannot manage to get rid of. (p. 38, emphasis in original) Although I reject the notion of identity as a personal choice, I am reinterpreting Bauman’s position with reference to the relative capacity to improvise upon what is given. Most of us, says Bauman, “are suspended uneasily between those two poles,” and must tolerate a level of anxiety surrounding the precariousness of our identities (p. 38). Finally, Bauman notes: “there is a lower space than low—a space underneath the bottom” (p. 39). In this space dwell those whom he calls the “underclass,” those whom Sassen ( 2014 ) calls “the expelled.” These inhabitants have no identities at all, even those that may be oppressive: The meaning of the ‘underclass identity’ is an absence of identity ; the effacement or denial of individuality, of ‘face’—that object of ethical duty and moral care. You are cast outside the social space in which identities are sought, chosen, constructed, evaluated, confirmed or refuted. (Bauman, 2004 , p. 39, emphasis in original) Bauman is pointing here to desubjectivation in its most extreme form, and thus to what I am calling third-order suffering. While desubjectivation appears in other classes, in the underclass it is pervasive and near-absolute. But what I wish to emphasize here is that class has a dual meaning. It is both a potential identity and a power that generates and configures other identities. Thirdly, a post-capitalist intersectionality, or inter-relationality, refuses to ontologize or prioritize the differences that appear in human relationships. It is clear to most people, I think, that class is not ontological. It is not, in other words, given or natural. The ideal of social mobility—shared in the USA by political conservatives and liberals alike—assumes that one may be born into one class but ascend (or descend) into another. This is one thing that distinguishes capitalism, which divides society into classes, from pre-capitalist feudal societies, which divided the populace into rigid caste systems. What is often missed is that race and gender have no more ontological status than class. Scientific efforts to identify essential differences according to race and gender, beyond somatic variations such as sexual anatomy, skin pigmentation, eye color, body morphology, and hair texture have either come up empty or confirmed cultural stereotypes (e.g. Fields & Fields, 2014 ; Fine, 2010 ). Reed ( 2013 ) concludes that such efforts are “nothing more than narrow upper-class prejudices parading about as science” (p. 51). Theories emphasizing inter-relationality eschew assertions of essential difference and seek instead to identify ways that a hegemony utilizes asserted differences to serve its interests and agendas. The focus here is on how dominant powers create, configure, and utilize identities to accomplish political and material agendas. Regarding designations of race, Victor Anderson ( 1999 ) has been a pioneer in asserting that “blackness” is not ontological. Similarly, Fields and Fields ( 2014 ) argue that through a process the authors call “racecraft.” As Harry Chang (Liem & Montague, 1985 ) claimed during the 1970s, racialization is a type of reification: “Money seeks gold to objectify itself—gold does not cry out to be money” (p. 39). The upshot of all this, according to Reed, is that race and gender are “ascriptive differences” utilized by systems of domination: “Ideologies of ascriptive difference help to stabilize a social order by legitimizing its hierarchies of wealth, power, and privilege, including its social division of labor, as the natural order of things” (p. 49). This is not an argument for a “class first” approach. While gender and race, like class, are created and configured within matrices of domination, the consequent sexism and racism are quite real and take up lives of their own. Moreover, gender, race and class are always already entangled . It would be futile to attempt to prioritize them, even in concrete instances of oppression. For this reason, the statement of the Combahee River Collective ( 1977 /1979) asserts that “race, sex, and class are simultaneous factors in oppression” (p. 371). It is tempting to think that each may assume priority, depending on contextual circumstances. Even bell hooks (Lowens, 2012 ), in a recent interview, observes that theories of intersectionality “allow us to focus on what is most important at a given point in time. …Like right now, for many Americans, class is being foregrounded like never before because of the economic situation” (para. 19). I fear that such declarations may be slippery slopes that function to maintain antagonistic divisions within the progressive left. Furthermore, such a position does not attend to how, in everyday life, the oppressions circulating around these identities are directly , rather than inversely, proportional. It just does not seem to be the case that, with the increasing economic inequality under neoliberalism, class concerns move to the foreground, while sexism and racism recede. Rather, they all rise together and in tandem. It is true that rampant inequality has intensified class conflict and made it more visible. However, sexism has also increased under these conditions, with disproportional numbers of women pressured into low-paid and unpaid work, and with discrimination and violence against women accelerating (Braedley & Luxton, 2010 ; Connell, 2010 ). Likewise, growing economic inequality has been accompanied by suppressed income for blacks and by more frequent and egregious acts of violence and exploitation toward people of color (Giroux, 2010 ; Goldberg, 2009 ). It is surely no coincidence that this period, in the USA, has been marked by massive incarceration of blacks and an escalation in killings of unarmed blacks by law enforcement officials. As a parent, I fear for the future of my two biracial sons, now eight years of age, who will likely experience oppression at the hands of dominant neoliberal powers unless substantial changes occur. The point is that economic and social exclusion and exploitation go together. We simply can no longer afford a “class first” or “race first” or “gender fi rst” approach to political action. This brings us to a fourth dimension of a post-capitalist inter- relationality. While the statement of the Combahee River Collective ( 1977 /1979) may be interpreted as laying out the significance of identity politics, it is not the same identity politics that have become so familiar in neoliberal societies. Neoliberal identity politics have effectively balkanized what was once “the public.” Society breaks up into a multitude of identity groups, each more or less insulated from the others and in competition with them. This sort of fractiousness is absent in the statement of the Combahee River Collective. While clear about their own identity and interests, these women look for ways to collaborate with others, especially for political action. They stress, for example: “Although we are feminists and lesbians, we feel solidarity with progressive black men and do not advocate the fractionalization that white women who are separatists demand” (p. 365). After noting a number of examples, they emphasize that they “continue to do political work in coalition with other groups” (p. 371). This underscores that a postcapitalist inter-relationality presses through the recognition of difference in search of solidarity . If the problems of class exploitation, sexism, and racism arise together, then they must be addressed together. Pastoral theologian Cedric Johnson ( 2016a ) observes: Social exclusion and labor exploitation are different problems, but they are never disconnected under capitalism. And both processes work to the advantage of capital. Segmented labor markets, ethnic rivalry, racism, sexism, xenophobia, and informalization all work against solidarity. (para. 77) Any approach that gives primacy to a particular identity, much less attributing ontological status to it, necessarily undermines solidarity and political action. Johnson singles out “liberal antiracist discourse,” which separates race from class and prioritizes racism, as an example: Liberal antiracist discourse further isolates the conditions of the most excluded segments of workers, separating their experiences from those of other workers, and their labor from the broader processes at work, instead of emphasizing the empirical and potential unity of the laboring classes. (para. 78) This aids and abets the “divide and conquer” strategy that financial elites have historically used to divide working people against each other. Finally, a post-capitalist inter-relationality strives toward the increase of consciousness, particularly with regard to the social origins of suffering. Even with regard to second-order suffering, consciousness-raising is often critical. This is because the complex machinations of institutions and social systems tend to occur, as Marx often noted, “behind the backs” of the people. With third-order suffering—which arises from the synergy of deinstitutionalization, desymbolization, and desubjectivation—the increase of consciousness is even more important. As I discussed in previous sections, neoliberal rationality denies and thus renders sexism, racism, and class conflict invisible. Furthermore, by undertaking the “Three Ds,” neoliberalization erodes a sense of belonging, a common language for naming the suffering, and any durable agency. This yields the most profound unconsciousness imaginable, including, ultimately, a lack of awareness of goingon- being. How is the language of inter-relationality to make any sense for people in such a condition? Where are its referents now? We are reduced here to a voiceless and nameless suffering. So that is where we must begin. William Davies ( 2015 ) speaks, I believe, to this situation: “Rather than seek to alter our feelings, now would be a good time to take what we’ve turned inwards, and attempt to direct it back out again” (p. 11). Part of the wisdom of inter-relationality is that nothing can “make sense” outside of relationships. Especially when we no longer know who we are, and our suffering has no name, we need others who will be present to bear witness. We can only direct our suffering back out when we can direct it to others, even when this means, initially, sitting in silence together. There is no hope unless we can begin with at least this seed of solidarity. This does not mean “psychotherapy for everybody.” Rising from such a deep unconsciousness occurs best in groups, and perhaps even in movements, where “deep calls unto deep.” After many years of activism, Angela Davis ( 2016 ) confesses: I don’t know whether I would have survived had not movements survived, had not communities of resistance, communities of struggle. So whatever I’m doing I always feel myself directly connected to those communities and I think that this is an era where we have to encourage that sense of community particularly at a time when neoliberalism attempts to force people to think of themselves only in individual terms and not in collective terms. It is in collectivities that we find reservoirs of hope and optimism. (p. 49) So, to undo the spell of neoliberalism, we must “play the record in reverse.” That means finding paths, however meager, back to solidarity. And this brings us to the next chapter, in which I must respond to the inevitable question: “Where do we go from here?”

#### The Aff relies on a reductionist view of identity---this results in mystification of class contradictions in the service of uplift that benefits a select few instead of transformative agenda.

Adolph Reed 19, professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, 1-8-2019, "What Materialist Black Political History Actually Looks Like," nonsite.org, https://nonsite.org/editorial/what-materialist-black-political-history-actually-looks-like

The race-reductionist argument is propelled by a combination of intense moral fervor and crude self-interest. I’ve argued in 2018 articles in nonsite, The Baffler, and Dialectical Anthropology, that, as it has evolved, the post-2016 debate has thrown into bold relief the class character of antiracist and other expressions of identity politics.5 That could be a salutary product of the controversy. It’s good in this sort of debate for the mist of ideology to burn off and the material stakes involved to be clear and in the open. However, many people who have followed or even participated in the debates have not connected the dots to see that obvious point or to acknowledge its implications. One reason for failure to do so is summed up pithily in Upton Sinclair’s quip, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Not only would pursuit of an agenda focused on addressing “horizontal inequality,” if successful, disproportionately benefit upper-status, already well-off people—as Walter Benn Michaels and I have noted tirelessly over the past decade at least, the reality of a standard of justice based on eliminating group disparities is that a society could be just if 1% of the population controlled 90% of the resources so long as the one percent featured blacks, Hispanics, women, lesbians and gays, etc. in rough proportion to their representation in the general population; also, advocacy of defining the only meaningful inequality as disparities between groups is itself a career trajectory in the academy, as well as in the corporate, nonprofit and freelance commentary worlds. There’s no point trying to communicate with those whose resistance stems from such material investment; no matter what their specific content, their responses to class critique always amount to the orderly Turkle’s lament to McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest—“This is my fucking job!” Purblindness to identitarianism’s ever more clearly exposed class character also rests on naively habituated ideological thinking. Most of us operate with more or less vague or inchoate recognition that the past included bad old-timey times marked by openly racist practices like slavery and compulsory racial segregation, genocide against Native Americans, Chinese Exclusion, imposed gender hierarchies, etc. In lieu of examining the discrete sources of inequality in the present, antiracist ideology in particular depends on asserting superficial analogies to those earlier historical periods when racial exclusion and discrimination were more direct impediments to black Americans’ and other nonwhites’ social position and well-being. Thus, for example, Michelle Alexander proposes that contemporary mass incarceration be understood as a “new Jim Crow”6—though even she allows that the analogy doesn’t work—and expressions of outrage at miscarriages of justice in the present commonly allude to practices associated with slavery or the segregation era. As I have argued, such assertions are not to be taken literally as empirical claims; they are rhetorical. No sane or at all knowledgeable person can believe that black Americans live under similarly constrained and perilous conditions as they did a century ago or longer. Those analogies and allusions carry a silent preface: “(This incident/phenomenon/pattern makes it seem as though) Nothing has changed.” Yet the claim itself presumes that things have changed because the charge is essentially a denunciation of objectionable conditions or incidents in the present as atavistic and a call for others to regard them as such. Attempting to mobilize outrage about some action or expression through associating it with discredited or vilified views or practices is a common gambit in hortatory political rhetoric, more or less effective for a rally or leaflet. But this antiracist politics is ineffective and even destructive when it takes the place of scholarly interpretation or strategic political analysis.7 Political controversies in contemporary New Orleans provide an apt frame of reference for demonstrating antiracism’s limitations, and class character, as a politics. Antiracist political critique failed abysmally after Katrina to mobilize significant opposition to elimination of low-income public housing or to the ongoing destruction of public schools. In a context in which black people participate as administrators, functionaries, contractors, and investors—all in the blesséd name of racial representation—in the commercial opportunities provided by privatization and destruction of those institutions, that politics, which posits an abstract “black community” against an equally abstract “racism,” could not provide persuasive responses to the blend of underclass ideology that stigmatizes public housing as an incubator of a degraded population or that proffers culturalist explanations for failing schools.8 Debate over displacement for upscaling redevelopment, including proliferation of the Airbnb industry, is another powerful case in point in that city as elsewhere. In opting for a language of “gentrification,” opponents of displacement, often without necessarily intending to do so, cloud a simple, straightforward dynamic—public support of private developers’ pursuit of rent-intensifying redevelopment—with cultural implications that shift critique away from the issue of using public authority to engineer upward redistribution and impose hardship on relatively vulnerable residents. Instead, discussion of gentrification slides into objections about display of privilege, and lack of recognition or respect that, notwithstanding the moral outrage that accompanies them, accept the logic of rent-intensifying redevelopment as given and demand that newcomers acknowledge and honor aboriginal habitus and practices and that the “community” be involved in the processes of upgrading. The same racial or cultural discourse has unhelpfully shaped opposition to charterization of public education by focusing on the racial dimension of the process. The fundamental problem with Teach For America and the corporate privatizers for whom TFA are shock troops, after all, is not that the missionaries are mainly white and unfamiliar with native culture or even that many of them are tourists building extracurriculars for their graduate and professional school dossiers. Those are only idiosyncratically distasteful features of a particular line of attack on one front in a broader war on public goods and the idea of social solidarity, in line with marketization of all human needs. And that sort of culturalist discourse also opens opportunities for petty, and not so petty, entrepreneurship in the name of respect or recognition of the community, within the logic of neoliberalization. Race reductionism enables a sleight-of-hand in which benefits to individuals can appear to be victories for the generic racial population or community. The more deeply embedded a groupist notion of fairness or justice becomes as common sense, the more easily that sleight-of-hand works under labels like “community empowerment,” “voice,” “opportunity,” or “representation” to propel and legitimize accumulation by dispossession.9 This takes us back to Sinclair’s dictum, which underlies the material truth of antiracist politics and other expressions of identitarianism that are hostile to politics based on class solidarities. Yet even the crudest self-interest depends on ideological mystification for legitimacy. And race/racism—the former term is inconceivable without the latter—has always worked in exactly that way; only now, in the aftermath of the victories of the 1960s, it can work to the benefit as well as the detriment of nonwhites. The cornerstone of race ideology, which is not now and never has been incompatible with capitalism, is presumption of ontological-level differences among human populations apportioned into racial groups. Just as nineteenth and early twentieth century white supremacists insisted that fundamental differences preempt political alliances based on common material conditions, antiracists posit whites’ transhistorical—and thus primordial—commitment to racial supremacy toward the same end. That’s the more insidious basis of the impulse to argue for the primacy of race in contemporary politics via allusion to the past. Like all forms of race-reductionism it masks a class-skewed agenda. That underlying reality helps make sense both of why antiracists seem unconcerned that their elevation of challenging disparities to the paramount, if not exclusive, goal of egalitarian politics is entirely consistent with neoliberalism’s regime of intensifying economic inequality and why their de facto alliance with corporate and Wall Street Democrats against the conventional left has been automatic and untroubling. So I’ll conclude as I’d initially intended to begin this rumination, with several postulates about black American political history to counter the idealist mystifications that posit a primordial white racism or a transhistorical, reified White Supremacy capable of acting in the world on the conviction that, as Nihkil Singh and Joshua Clover most recently characterized it in a Verso blogpost, “black lives matter less.” Slavery was fundamentally a labor relation, not an extreme system of race relations. To paraphrase Barbara and Karen Fields, its objective was to produce cotton, sugar, tobacco, and rice, not white supremacy. Its appeal to the planter class was that it secured a labor force that had no rights or recourse, not that it was a permanent sadistic camp. Historian Kenneth Stampp quotes a slaveowner’s succinct explanation: “For what purpose does the master hold the servant? Is it not that by his labor, he, the master, may accumulate wealth?”10 An irony of the view that defines slavery as institutionalized brutality is its implication that slavery without extremes of brutalization might not be objectionable. The segregationist regime was an historically specific social order based on disfranchisement of the vast majority of blacks and a substantial percentage of whites, imposed by southern elites after defeat of the interracial Populist political insurgency in the late nineteenth century. It was defined by an extensive, legally codified system of racial subordination. That order was not fully consolidated before World War I, and its institutional foundations were crushed by the late 1960s. That is, it was a regime that prevailed for roughly sixty years, depending on location. There is no singular, transhistorical “Black Liberation Struggle” or “Black Freedom Movement,” and there never has been. Black Americans have engaged in many different forms of political expression in many different domains, around many different issues, both those considered racial and not. They have engaged in race-solidaristic formations and in close concert with others, in class-based and multiclass alliances. As Cedric Johnson has argued forcefully, contemporary scholarly discussion reads “black politics”—the ethnic pluralist group politics articulated mainly since the 1960s—back anachronistically onto the varying and pragmatically grounded political expressions in which black Americans have engaged since Emancipation, which he describes as “black American political life.” Political differentiation has been as common among black Americans as among all others. Moreover, issues bearing specifically on race or racial disparities have never exhausted, or exclusively defined, black Americans’ expressed political concerns. As a corollary of 3, the issues driving the postwar southern mass mobilization against segregation and the emergent black interest-group urban politics in the North and West, and the big city South, were distinct. Lumping them together under a blanket construct like the “long civil rights movement” does not help us comprehend the discrete features of either or, more important, the distinct trajectories each set in motion. Black Power was not a mass, radical insurgent movement. It was a militant expression of ethnic pluralism. Radicals of various sorts—including ideological race nationalists—occupied its fringes, but the driving and commanding forces of Black Power politics were always the assertive elements within the new black political and professional-managerial class that emerged from opportunity structures opened by the victories of the Civil Rights movement, the dynamics of urban demographic transition and incorporation into governing regimes, and War on Poverty, Model Cities, and foundation-funded programs. Nominally radical groups, such as the Black Panther Party (BPP), the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, and others with less cachet among the left, were not serious alternatives, certainly not the romantic “roads tragically not taken” of post-New Left fantasies. General Baker, longtime United Auto Workers activist and co-founder of both the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM) and the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, was emphatically clear that those tendencies were entirely specific to Detroit and the centrality of the union in local Democratic politics. The BPP was founded in 1966, and by the end of the decade was already in disarray, especially outside Oakland, as a result of police repression, to be sure, but also of their political incoherence. Neither Malcolm X, Frantz Fanon, C.L.R. James, nor Stuart Hall can tell us anything strategically useful about the black American political situation. Appeals to their putative wisdom stem from academic leftists’ romantic attachments and commitments to race-reductionist politics. Malcolm was dead before nearly all the big events understood to define “The Sixties” had occurred. Fanon died several years before Malcolm, and in any case his focus was always elsewhere; he gave only the most general, perfunctory attention to the United States. James’s time in the United States, as I have said, was on the political equivalent of a tourist visa. He was not enmeshed in black American politics and understood its internal and external dynamics in only an abstract, formalist way. The same pertains to Stuart Hall. Attachments to the likes of Malcolm, Fanon, James, and Hall are more totemic than intellectually or politically productive. There is a more pernicious aspect of embrace of those figures’ supposed cultural authority. Each is read as propounding trans-contextual insights about “race.” And such insights are necessarily race-reductionist.

#### The aff replicates neoliberalism at the level of form – though their politics may appear revolutionary, it mirrors market dynamics in its appeal to individual transformation and particular forms of resistance – this makes true change impossible and re-entrenches capitalism

Susana Narotsky 16, Barcelona professor, “On waging the ideological war: Against the hegemony of form”, Anthropological Theory 2016, Vol. 16, 263–284)

I have been involved for over 10 years with a large group of male industrial workers and their families in a town in the northwest of Spain. The area has been in ongoing restructuring since the 1980s and early retirement, lay-offs, and long-term unemployment have become the norm. Women have increasingly found temporary jobs in the service sector and younger generations are generally unemployed, have precarious jobs in contract firms or have migrated. Historically, labour struggle structured through class-based unions has been ubiquitous here, and has yielded what people voice as ‘conquests’ (universal public services such as health and education, and political rights through parliamentary democracy). Today, the situation is one of generalized uncertainty and hesitant forms of resistance. As years have passed I have observed three distinct processes: (1) the waning of a workingclass faith in unions and union mobilization, (2) the multiplication of forms of activism that target concrete issues, and (3) a creeping hopelessness demobilizing younger generations. In this context, old-time unionists who have shifted their struggle toward social activism tend to analyse situations in terms of local connection with larger processes expressing structural logics. Analysis produces the design of a strategy and tactical mobilizations that they strive to explain in an endless pedagogy of struggle. Knowledge and theory become instruments of change and are understood as stemming from everyday life experience. In contrast, younger people – with the exception of a small group of young, unionized industrial workers – tend to present the local situation as an aggregate of concrete personal experiences. A few build collective supports based on social networks, a practice that they sometimes abstract as a theory of solidarity that challenges the state and capitalism by opening spaces where alternative provisioning processes put people instead of profit as the aim. Their theory is also based on their experience, on political and social mobilizations (15M, Indignados, Anti-Foreclosure Platform) and miscellaneous readings that encompass a wide range of perspectives including political economy, political ecology, anarchism, de-growth, social and solidarity economy, and commoning. Both groups stress the need to be aware of and respect the multiple social positioning of those that suffer from capitalism. In practice, however, the older group tends to produce a coherent model and to design a unified oppositional strategy, while the younger group is explicitly unwilling to do so. As a result, the local practice of social activism is a succession of short-term targeted actions often subjected to the tensions of endless idiosyncratic strategies. Demoralization is recurrent and is expressed in the small numbers and high turnover of younger people in activist groups. If we factor history in, it is difficult to describe the situation of the present younger generation as ‘worse’ than that of their predecessors. Yes, they are massively unemployed or in precarious jobs, but ‘stable’ industrial jobs in the 1950s and 1960s in Spain under fascism did not provide a much better livelihood. The present-day welfare state and universal public services, however shrunken, are much better than the previous non-existent ones. One major difference is the lack of expectations for a brighter future on the part of the younger, better-educated generations. Another major difference is their unwillingness to produce or adopt a coherent oppositional ideology that could become counter-hegemonic. The remains of an old debate: The hegemony of form With this in mind, I interrogate the fierce criticism and ultimate abandonment of the concept of ideology as an instrument for struggle by those who would like to change the existing structure of power and economic distribution. I suggest that (a) distrust of the concept’s validity stems from the domination of a neoliberal conceptual tool-kit in particular as it has been instituted by the rise of the Austrian school and its hegemony in neoliberal thought. This has resulted in (b) an incapacity

to imagine an alternative project that does not ultimately rest on the basic formal premises of neoliberalism: individualism (or singularity), freedom and exchange. The Austrian school developed as a coherent ideological model during the 1940s and 1950s (Hayek, 1948; for an account of the emergence of the Austrian school see Foucault, 2004) and became established as a powerful economic model in the 1990s (Harvey, 2007). Its major innovations emerged from the ‘socialist calculation’ debate that dated from the early 20th century (Hayek, 1938; Lange, 1936, 1937). What was at stake in this apparently technical debate was an epistemological issue of import: could society exist as a coherent whole and the knowledge about it be gathered and organized to meet a particular end? Or was reality an emergent result of the interaction of ‘dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess’ (Hayek, 1948: 77), and hence could not be organized to advantage? Although in a first round the debate seemed to have been won by the ‘socialist’ camp, in a second round the Austrian school imposed its views and eventually became hegemonic. The point I wish to make here is that the triumph of the epistemological premise for eliciting knowledge that the Austrian school proposed as being the only possible way to capture the reality of imperfect market competition has permeated our lives, becoming an hegemony of form. The debate hinged on how to achieve market coordination. The ‘socialist’ side maintained the parameters of neoclassical market theory (perfect knowledge, competition, equilibrium and efficient allocation) but focused on the problems of calculation and planning. In contrast the Austrian school introduced the discovery of tacit knowledge as key to the model of market operation. This important shift from the neoclassical model stemmed from the awareness that real market situations were based on imperfect knowledge.4 It then assumed that competition was a creative process that elicited knowledge about possible demand. Hence, ‘the problem is how subjective, or tacit, knowledge, necessarily fragmented and dispersed, can be socially mobilized’ (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 59). Hayek argued ‘that the mobilization and coordination of this incomplete and contradictory knowledge occur through the actions of entrepreneurs, competing against one another in the market process, discovering and learning what is and is not possible’ (Adaman and Devine, 1997: 59). This creative dynamic not only required entrepreneurship but also a constant effort at innovation, that is, of creating difference that would momentarily provide monopoly advantage in the market.5 In the 1980s and 1990s scholars in the West (Adaman and Devine, 1997; Elson, 1988) attempted to counter the Austrian economic school’s expanding hegemony in a context of increasing hardship of the population subject to structural adjustment programmes. They revisited the parameters of the original debate about market coordination in socialism in an attempt to reconfigure them while vindicating their worth for a new socialist project.6 The Austrian school’s underlying assumptions about the form of eliciting knowledge from discrete and dispersed social agents, which was the crux of that debate, are in my opinion similar to contemporary efforts to theorize an alternative to capitalism that would support a unified political struggle and durable transformation. In its central methodological assumption about how to elicit tacit knowledge through exchange, a process that will then be expressed in prices which will guide further action, this model contains some formal significant parallels with certain practices of present day (de)mobilizations and the critical theories that sustain them. The basic premise of the Austrian school is the existence of dispersed (independent and autonomous) individuals possessing largely ‘tacit’ knowledge (i.e. pre-conscious or unconscious knowledge; M. Polanyi, 1967). It is this methodological (formal) premise which, I suggest, is enacted by present-day anti-capitalist and social justice mobilizations and may be at the source of their incapacity to produce a coherent and robust counter-hegemony. The emergent aspect of knowledge about the world that results from free market interaction and supports the economic model appears to me similar in its form to post-structuralist epistemological and political models such as the ‘sociology of emergences’ (Santos, 2004a) or the virtual ‘constituent power’ of a multitude of desiring subjectivities (Negri, 2009). While this anti-authoritarian view of the world is extremely attractive to radical activism it seems to lack the capacity to become counter-hegemonic precisely because it is based on a form that is like the one that supports the system it seeks to transcend. I am not saying that this is an intentional or even conscious move, on the contrary, in my opinion it expresses the hegemony of form. In the post-structuralist mobilization/activism theories, the political project is created through a process of permanent discovery as a result of the free interaction of subjectivities, knowledges, and world(view)s. The creative, innovative and democratic aspect of this emergent politics is opposed to Western ideologies and institutions of modernist liberal politics. In particular, this new form of politics is premised on eliciting difference as opposed to the ‘enlightened’ aim of eliciting equality, a shift that parallels the move from neoclassical to Austrian models of the economy. The shift is subtle but can be found in the premise that the forces of political change should arise from autonomous – equal but essentially different – entities or ‘singularities’ (be it individuals or quasi-corporate groups such as ‘communities’) that, to push the metaphor further, could be described as adopting an ‘enterprise form’ (Foucault, 2004: 154) and interacting in a ‘market-like’ arena (e.g. a ‘forum’) where they create social value. However, in these oppositional political models cooperation rather than competition is the relationship that produces social value in the exchange arena, and this is a major difference. To use Lazaratto’s words, common goods emerge ‘as a result of co-creation and co-realization of the cooperation of ordinary subjectivities’ in the event-driven arena (Lazaratto, 2006: 129). These new models eschew the old revolutionary ideologies that were premised on designing a whole (brave) new world on the basis of understanding existing relations as a connected totality that needed to be challenged in its entirety. According to Santos (2004a: 243), ‘There is no unique theory to guide the movements, because the aim is not so much to seize power but rather to change the many faces of power as they present themselves in the institutions and sociabilities. At this level, the novelty consists in the celebration of diversity and pluralism, experimentalism, and radical democracy.’ These movements are understood as able to open up spaces where the plural visions of alternative (better) worlds can emerge and be expressed. Through their punctuated practices they challenge in myriad ways the hegemony of capitalism and provide content for the critical theorization of political struggle. While these oppositional movements are undoubtedly a form of struggle which produces results and unleashes counter-hegemonic forces, I suggest that their fragmented expression (in practice and theory) and their unwillingness to unify the struggle around an ideological project blocks their ability to overhaul our globalized society. Why is this so? My hypothesis is that the event-driven pluralistic political model, while considered revolutionary by its promoters, may be the paradoxical expression of a hegemonic neoliberal ‘power informing society’, the power of form (Foucault, 2004: 154).

#### Stopping capital is necessary to avoid extinction

William Robinson 16, UC Santa Barbra sociology professor, 4-12-2016, “Sadistic Capitalism: Six Urgent Matters for Humanity in Global Crisis,” http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/35596-sadistic-capitalism-six-urgent-matters-for-humanity-in-global-crisis)

In these mean streets of globalized capitalism in crisis, it has become profitable to turn poverty and inequality into a tourist attraction. The South African Emoya Luxury Hotel and Spa company has made a glamorized spectacle of it. The resort recently advertised an opportunity for tourists to stay "in our unique Shanty Town ... and experience traditional township living within a safe private game reserve environment." A cluster of simulated shanties outside of Bloemfontein that the company has constructed "is ideal for team building, braais, bachelors [parties], theme parties and an experience of a lifetime," read the ad. The luxury accommodations, made to appear from the outside as shacks, featured paraffin lamps, candles, a battery-operated radio, an outside toilet, a drum and fireplace for cooking, as well as under-floor heating, air conditioning and wireless internet access. A well-dressed, young white couple is pictured embracing in a field with the corrugated tin shanties in the background. The only thing missing in this fantasy world of sanitized space and glamorized poverty was the people themselves living in poverty. The "luxury shanty town" in South Africa is a fitting metaphor for global capitalism as a whole. Faced with a stagnant global economy, elites have managed to turn war, structural violence and inequality into opportunities for capital, pleasure and entertainment. It is hard not to conclude that unchecked capitalism has become what I term "sadistic capitalism," in which the suffering and deprivation generated by capitalism become a source of aesthetic pleasure, leisure and entertainment for others. I recently had the opportunity to travel through several countries in Latin America, the Middle East, North Africa, East Asia and throughout North America. I was on sabbatical to research what the global crisis looks like on the ground around the world. Everywhere I went, social polarization and political tensions have reached explosive dimensions. Where is the crisis headed, what are the possible outcomes and what does it tell us about global capitalism and resistance? This crisis is not like earlier structural crises of world capitalism, such as in the 1930s or 1970s. This one is fast becoming systemic. The crisis of humanity shares aspects of earlier structural crises of world capitalism, but there are six novel, interrelated dimensions to the current moment that I highlight here, in broad strokes, as the "big picture" context in which countries and peoples around the world are experiencing a descent into chaos and uncertainty. 1) The level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented in the face of out-of-control, over-accumulated capital. In January 2016, the development agency Oxfam published a follow-up to its report on global inequality that had been released the previous year. According to the new report, now just 62 billionaires -- down from 80 identified by the agency in its January 2015 report -- control as much wealth as one half of the world's population, and the top 1% owns more wealth than the other 99% combined. Beyond the transnational capitalist class and the upper echelons of the global power bloc, the richest 20 percent of humanity owns some 95 percent of the world's wealth, while the bottom 80 percent has to make do with just 5 percent. This 20-80 divide of global society into haves and the have-nots is the new global social apartheid. It is evident not just between rich and poor countries, but within each country, North and South, with the rise of new affluent high-consumption sectors alongside the downward mobility, "precariatization," destabilization and expulsion of majorities. Escalating inequalities fuel capitalism's chronic problem of over-accumulation: The transnational capitalist class cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to stagnation in the world economy. The signs of an impending depression are everywhere. The front page of the February 20 issue of The Economist read, "The World Economy: Out of Ammo?" Extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge to dominant groups. They strive to purchase the loyalty of that 20 percent, while at the same time dividing the 80 percent, co-opting some into a hegemonic bloc and repressing the rest. Alongside the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression is heightened dissemination through the culture industries and corporate marketing strategies that depoliticize through consumerist fantasies and the manipulation of desire. As "Trumpism" in the United States so well illustrates, another strategy of co-optation is the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled toward scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Scapegoated communities are under siege, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar, the Muslim minority in India, the Kurds in Turkey, southern African immigrants in South Africa, and Syrian and Iraqi refugees and other immigrants in Europe. As with its 20th century predecessor, 21st century fascism hinges on such manipulation of social anxiety at a time of acute capitalist crisis. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend to projects of 21st century fascism. 2) The system is fast reaching the ecological limits to its reproduction. We have reached several tipping points in what environmental scientists refer to as nine crucial "planetary boundaries." We have already exceeded these boundaries in three areas -- climate change, the nitrogen cycle and diversity loss. There have been five previous mass extinctions in earth's history. While all these were due to natural causes, for the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system. We have entered what Paul Crutzen, the Dutch environmental scientist and Nobel Prize winner, termed the Anthropocene -- a new age in which humans have transformed up to half of the world's surface. We are altering the composition of the atmosphere and acidifying the oceans at a rate that undermines the conditions for life. The ecological dimensions of global crisis cannot be understated. "We are deciding, without quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be closed," observes Elizabeth Kolbert in her best seller, The Sixth Extinction. "No other creature has ever managed this ... The Sixth Extinction will continue to determine the course of life long after everything people have written and painted and built has been ground into dust." Capitalism cannot be held solely responsible. The human-nature contradiction has deep roots in civilization itself. The ancient Sumerian empires, for example, collapsed after the population over-salinated their crop soil. The Mayan city-state network collapsed about AD 900 due to deforestation. And the former Soviet Union wrecked havoc on the environment. However, given capital's implacable impulse to accumulate profit and its accelerated commodification of nature, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system. "Green capitalism" appears as an oxymoron, as sadistic capitalism's attempt to turn the ecological crisis into a profit-making opportunity, along with the conversion of poverty into a tourist attraction. 3) The sheer magnitude of the means of violence is unprecedented, as is the concentrated control over the means of global communications and the production and circulation of knowledge, symbols and images. We have seen the spread of frightening new systems of social control and repression that have brought us into the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control. This real-life Orwellian world is in a sense more perturbing than that described by George Orwell in his iconic novel 1984. In that fictional world, people were compelled to give their obedience to the state ("Big Brother") in exchange for a quiet existence with guarantees of employment, housing and other social necessities. Now, however, the corporate and political powers that be force obedience even as the means of survival are denied to the vast majority. Global apartheid involves the creation of "green zones" that are cordoned off in each locale around the world where elites are insulated through new systems of spatial reorganization, social control and policing. "Green zone" refers to the nearly impenetrable area in central Baghdad that US occupation forces established in the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The command center of the occupation and select Iraqi elite inside that green zone were protected from the violence and chaos that engulfed the country. Urban areas around the world are now green zoned through gentrification, gated communities, surveillance systems, and state and private violence. Inside the world's green zones, privileged strata avail themselves of privatized social services, consumption and entertainment. They can work and communicate through internet and satellite sealed off under the protection of armies of soldiers, police and private security forces. Green zoning takes on distinct forms in each locality. In Palestine, I witnessed such zoning in the form of Israeli military checkpoints, Jewish settler-only roads and the apartheid wall. In Mexico City, the most exclusive residential areas in the upscale Santa Fe District are accessible only by helicopter and private gated roads. In Johannesburg, a surreal drive through the exclusive Sandton City area reveals rows of mansions that appear as military compounds, with private armed towers and electrical and barbed-wire fences. In Cairo, I toured satellite cities ringing the impoverished center and inner suburbs where the country's elite could live out their aspirations and fantasies. They sport gated residential complexes with spotless green lawns, private leisure and shopping centers and English-language international schools under the protection of military checkpoints and private security police. In other cities, green zoning is subtler but no less effective. In Los Angeles, where I live, the freeway system now has an express lane reserved for those that can pay an exorbitant toll. On this lane, the privileged speed by, while the rest remain one lane over, stuck in the city's notorious bumper-to-bumper traffic -- or even worse, in notoriously underfunded and underdeveloped public transportation, where it may take half a day to get to and from work. There is no barrier separating this express lane from the others. However, a near-invisible closed surveillance system monitors every movement. If a vehicle without authorization shifts into the exclusive lane, it is instantly recorded by this surveillance system and a heavy fine is imposed on the driver, under threat of impoundment, while freeway police patrols are ubiquitous. Outside of the global green zones, warfare and police containment have become normalized and sanitized for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. "Militainment" -- portraying and even glamorizing war and violence as entertaining spectacles through Hollywood films and television police shows, computer games and corporate "news" channels -- may be the epitome of sadistic capitalism. It desensitizes, bringing about complacency and indifference. In between the green zones and outright warfare are prison industrial complexes, immigrant and refugee repression and control systems, the criminalization of outcast communities and capitalist schooling. The omnipresent media and cultural apparatuses of the corporate economy, in particular, aim to colonize the mind -- to undermine the ability to think critically and outside the dominant worldview. A neofascist culture emerges through militarism, extreme masculinization, racism and racist mobilizations against scapegoats. 4) We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling the bicycle, you fall over. If the capitalist system stops expanding outward, it enters crisis and faces collapse. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion -- from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. Meanwhile, the privatization of education, health care, utilities, basic services and public land are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital's control into "spaces of capital." Even poverty has been turned into a commodity. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? With the limits to expansion comes a turn toward militarized accumulation -- making wars of endless destruction and reconstruction and expanding the militarization of social and political institutions so as to continue to generate new opportunities for accumulation in the face of stagnation. 5) There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a "planet of slums," alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins and subject to these sophisticated systems of social control and destruction. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. These systems include prison labor, the forced recruitment of miners at gunpoint by warlords contracted by global corporations to dig up valuable minerals in the Congo, sweatshops and exploited immigrant communities (including the rising tide of immigrant female caregivers for affluent populations). Furthermore, the global working class is experiencing accelerated "precariatization." The "new precariat" refers to the proletariat that faces capital under today's unstable and precarious labor relations -- informalization, casualization, part-time, temp, immigrant and contract labor. As communities are uprooted everywhere, there is a rising reserve army of immigrant labor. The global working class is becoming divided into citizen and immigrant workers. The latter are particularly attractive to transnational capital, as the lack of citizenship rights makes them particularly vulnerable, and therefore, exploitable. The challenge for dominant groups is how to contain the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity, the immigrant workforce and the precariat. How can they contain the explosive contradictions of this system? The 21st century megacities become the battlegrounds between mass resistance movements and the new systems of mass repression. Some populations in these cities (and also in abandoned countryside) are at risk of genocide, such as those in Gaza, zones in Somalia and Congo, and swaths of Iraq and Syria. 6) There is a disjuncture between a globalizing economy and a nation-state-based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and do not wield enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on runaway transnational capital. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for instance, the governments of the G-8 and G-20 were unable to impose transnational regulation on the global financial system, despite a series of emergency summits to discuss such regulation. Elites historically have attempted to resolve the problems of over-accumulation by state policies that can regulate the anarchy of the market. However, in recent decades, transnational capital has broken free from the constraints imposed by the nation-state. The more "enlightened" elite representatives of the transnational capitalist class are now clamoring for transnational mechanisms of regulation that would allow the global ruling class to reign in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below. At the same time, the division of the world into some 200 competing nation-states is not the most propitious of circumstances for the global working class. Victories in popular struggles from below in any one country or region can (and often do) become diverted and even undone by the structural power of transnational capital and the direct political and military domination that this structural power affords the dominant groups. In Greece, for instance, the leftist Syriza party came to power in 2015 on the heels of militant worker struggles and a mass uprising. But the party abandoned its radical program as a result of the enormous pressure exerted on it from the European Central Bank and private international creditors. The Systemic Critique of Global Capitalism A growing number of transnational elites themselves now recognize that any resolution to the global crisis must involve redistribution downward of income. However, in the viewpoint of those from below, a neo-Keynesian redistribution within the prevailing corporate power structure is not enough. What is required is a redistribution of power downward and transformation toward a system in which social need trumps private profit. A global rebellion against the transnational capitalist class has spread since the financial collapse of 2008. Wherever one looks, there is popular, grassroots and leftist struggle, and the rise of new cultures of resistance: the Arab Spring; the resurgence of leftist politics in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in Europe; the tenacious resistance of Mexican social movements following the Ayotzinapa massacre of 2014; the favela uprising in Brazil against the government's World Cup and Olympic expulsion policies; the student strikes in Chile; the remarkable surge in the Chinese workers' movement; the shack dwellers and other poor people's campaigns in South Africa; Occupy Wall Street, the immigrant rights movement, Black Lives Matter, fast food workers' struggle and the mobilization around the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in the United States. This global revolt is spread unevenly and faces many challenges. A number of these struggles, moreover, have suffered setbacks, such as the Greek working-class movement and, tragically, the Arab Spring. What type of a transformation is viable, and how do we achieve it? How we interpret the global crisis is itself a matter of vital importance as politics polarize worldwide between a neofascist and a popular response. The systemic critique of global capitalism must strive to influence, from this vantage point, the discourse and practice of movements for a more just distribution of wealth and power. Our survival may depend on it.

#### The alternative is a politics of organizing around the common experience of life shaped by political economy. This starting point creates a mode of solidarity that doesn’t just add categories and stirs but creates an inclusive class identity via struggle that transforms participants.

Leo Panitch 18, York University Canada Research Chair in Comparative Political Economy, From the Streets to the State: Changing The World By Taking Power, pg 26-28

What accounts for the impasse of the left by the late twentieth century? Over the last four decades one of the central tropes of intellectual discourse, epitomized by the popularity of Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, criticizes the strategic mistake of excessively emphasizing class identity and consciousness. Even Geoff Eley’s (2002) monumental historical study, quoted above, which demonstrates how effective socialist labor movements were as advocates for democratic reform, also stresses “the insufficiencies of socialist advocacy,” not least pertaining to gender and race, in terms of “all the ways socialism’s dominance of the Left marginalized issues not easily assimilable to the class-political precepts so fundamental to the socialist vision” (10). Yet the left’s current conundrum in the face of the new right also brings to light the insufficiencies of the politics of identity, which has not only filled the void of class politics in recent decades but has often played a significant role in shunting class aside. Adolph Reed Jr. (1999) has perhaps most powerfully made the case for “a politics focused on bringing people together” around the common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy—for example, finding, keeping or advancing in a job with a living wage, keeping or attaining access to decent healthcare, securing decent, affordable housing. . . . Such concerns and the objective of collectively crafting a vehicle to address them is a politics that proceeds from what we have in common. . . . To the extent that differences are real and meaningful, the best way to negotiate them is from a foundation of shared purpose and practical solidarity based on a pragmatic understanding of the old principle that an injury to one is an injury to all. This is not simply a politics that attempts to build on a base in the working class; it is a politics that in the process can fashion a broadly inclusive class identity. (xxvii–xxviii) The failure to absorb this strategic insight, which might entail severe costs even for liberal democracy, is becoming ever clearer amidst the reactionary electoral appeal of a new right to working class voters. Nevertheless, this chapter shall argue that it also has much to do with the longstanding problems with the practice of democracy inside the institutions of the labor movement and the political parties with which they were intertwined. It has become far too commonplace to address these problems by criticizing the “ontological” mistake of those theorists who advance a class-oriented politics. This is a kind of idealism which attributes far too much historical impact to theoretical texts. It avoids serious inquiry into what determined the actual historical practices of working class parties and unions as democratic institutions. It thereby fails to uncover what really accounts for their limited contribution to the development of workers’ democratic capacities so as to carry the struggle for democracy beyond the electoral arena to the workplace, to the corporations and banks that dominate the economy, and perhaps most important to the democratization of the institutions of the state.

## Case

#### Surrendering to blackness is apolitical – different black folks have different politics, and using identity rather than political content as the metric of value collapses solidarity across racial lines.

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor 16, assistant professor in Princeton University's Center for African American Studies, Ch. 7 in From #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation, p. 211-216

Far and away, African Americans suffer most from the blunt force trauma of the American criminal justice system, but the pervasive character of law-and-order politics means that whites get caught up in its web as well. African Americans are imprisoned at an absurd rate of 2,300 for every 100,000 Black people. White people, on the other hand, are incarcerated at a rate of 450 people per 100,000. The difference speaks directly to the racial disparities that define American criminal justice, but it is worth noting that the rate at which white people in the United States are incarcerated is still higher than the incarceration rates of almost every other country in the world.33 It’s also unquestionable that Blacks and Latino/as experience death at the hands of police at much greater rates than whites, but thousands of white people have also been murdered by the police. This does not mean the experiences of whites and people of color are equal, but there is a basis for solidarity among white and nonwhite working-class people. This more complicated picture of the material reality of white working-class life is not intended to diminish the extent to which ordinary whites buy into or accept racist ideas about Blacks. It is also true that, by every social measure, whites do better than African Americans on average, tchabut that does not say much about who benefits from the inequality of our society. For example, in a country with four hundred billionaires, what does it mean that 43 percent of white households make only between $10,000 and $49,000 a year?34 Of course, an even larger number of Black people make this pitiful amount—65 percent—but when we only compare the average incomes of working-class Blacks and whites, we miss the much more dramatic disparity between the wealthiest and everyone else. If it isn’t in the interest of ordinary whites to be racist, why do they accept racist ideas? First, the same question could be asked of any group of workers. Why do men accept sexist ideas? Why do many Black workers accept racist anti-immigrant rhetoric? Why do many Black Caribbean and African immigrant workers think that Black Americans are lazy? Why do most American workers of all ethnicities accept racist ideas about Arabs and Muslims? In short, if most people agree that it would be in the interest of any group of workers to be more united than divided, then why do workers hold reactionary ideas that are an obstacle to unity? There are two primary reasons: competition and the prevalence of ruling-class ideology. Capitalism creates false scarcity, the perception that need outstrips resources. When billions are spent on war, police-brutality settlements, and publicly subsidized sports stadiums, there never seems to be a shortage of money. But when it comes to schools, housing, food, and other basic necessities, politicians always complain about deficits and the need to curb spending and cut budgets. The scarcity is manufactured, but the competition over these resources is real. People who are forced to fight over basic necessities are often willing to believe the worst about other workers to justify why they should have something while others should not. The prevailing ideology in a given society consists of the ideas that influence how we understand the world and help us make sense of our lives—through news, entertainment, education, and more. The political and economic elite shape the ideological world we all live in, to their benefit. We live in a thoroughly racist society, so it should not be surprising that people have racist ideas. The more important question is under what circumstances those ideas can change. There is a clash between the prevailing ideology in society and people’s lived experience. The media may inundate the public with constant images and news stories that describe Blacks as criminals or on welfare, but an individual’s experience with Blacks at work may completely contradict the stereotype—hence the insistence from many whites that they are not racist because they “know Black people.” It can be true in that person’s mind. People’s consciousness can change and can even contradict itself. This is also true for African Americans, who can harbor racist ideas about other Black people while simultaneously holding antiracist ideas. After all, Black people also live in this racist society and are equally inundated with racist stereotypes. The development of consciousness is never linear—it is constantly fluctuating between adhering to ideas that fit a “common sense” conception of society and being destabilized by real-life events that upend “common sense.” The Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci explains the phenomenon of mixed consciousness this way: The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity which nonetheless involves understanding the world in so far as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can . . . be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousness[es] (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all fellow workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. The person is strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices of all past phases of history at the local level and intuitions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over.35 Whether or not a group of workers has reactionary, mixed, or even revolutionary consciousness does not change its objective status as exploited and oppressed labor. The achievement of consciousness is the difference between the working class being a class in itself as opposed to a class for itself. It affects whether or not workers are in a position to fundamentally alter their reality through collective action. As one writer observed, “Only a collective can develop a systematic alternative world view, can overcome to some degree the alienation of manual and mental work that imposes on everyone, on workers and intellectuals alike, a partial and fragmented view of reality.”36 Just because white workers, to take a specific example, may at times fully accept reactionary ideas about African Americans does not change the objective fact that the majority of the US poor are white, the majority of people without health insurance are white, and the majority of the homeless are white. It is true that Blacks and Latino/as are disproportionately affected by the country’s harsh economic order, but this is a reality they share with the majority of white workers. The common experience of oppression and exploitation creates the potential for a united struggle to better the conditions of all. This is obviously not an automatic process, nor is it a given that essentially economic struggles will translate to support or struggle for the political rights of Blacks to be free of discrimination and racism. Political unity, including winning white workers to the centrality of racism in shaping the lived experiences of Black and Latino/a workers, is key to their own liberation. Tim Wise’s observations reduce these real issues to an abstract accusation of “privileging” class over race. But our movement has to have theoretical, political, and strategic clarity to confront challenges in the real world. When, in 2012, Chicago’s Black public school CEO Barbara Byrd Bennett was scheming with mayor Rahm Emanuel to close more than fifty schools located exclusively in Black and Latino/a neighborhoods, should Black teachers, students, and parents have united with Bennett, who has certainly experienced racism and sexism in her life and career, but who was also leading the charge to undo public education in Chicago? Or should they have united with the thousands of white teachers in Chicago schools and the vice president of the Chicago Teachers Union, a white, heterosexual man, to build the movement to save public education in the city? Probably very few people in history have had as much racist invective directed at them as Barack Obama has—hating him is basically shorthand for racism now. But he has also championed policies that absolved the banks and Wall Street of any responsibility for crashing the economy; as a result, since 2007 ten million people have been displaced from more than four million homes by the foreclosure crisis.37 Should Black workers put that aside and unite with Obama out of racial solidarity and a shared “lived experience,” or should they unite with ordinary whites and Latino/as who have also lost their homes to challenge a political program that regularly defends business interests to the detriment of all working-class and poor people? In the abstract, perhaps these are complicated questions. But in the daily struggles to defend public education, fight for real healthcare reform, or stop predatory foreclosures, these are the concrete questions every movement faces. The “blind spot” of class within the framework of people like Tim Wise not only leaves them incapable of explaining class division among the oppressed, it also underemphasizes the material foundation for solidarity and unity within the working class. Instead, the concepts of solidarity and unity are reduced to whether or not one chooses to be an “ally.” There’s nothing wrong with being an ally, but it doesn’t quite capture the degree to which Black and white workers are inextricably linked. It’s not as if white workers can simply choose not to “ally” with Black workers to no peril of their own. The scale of attack on the living standards of the working class is overwhelming. There is a systematic, bipartisan effort to dismantle the already anemic welfare state. When, in 2013, $5 billion cut was cut from food stamps, it had a direct and deleterious impact on the lives of tens of millions of white working-class people. In this context, solidarity is not just an option; it is crucial to workers’ ability to resist the constant degradation of their living standards. Solidarity is only possible through relentless struggle to win white workers to antiracism, to expose the lie that Black workers are worse off because they somehow choose to be, and to win the white working class to the understanding that, unless they struggle, they too will continue to live lives of poverty and frustration, even if those lives are somewhat better than the lives led by Black workers. Success or failure are contingent on whether or not working people see themselves as brothers and sisters whose liberation is inextricably bound together. Solidarity is standing in unity with people even when you have not personally experienced their particular oppression, The reality is that as long as capitalism exists, material and ideological pressures push white workers to be racist and all workers to hold each other in general suspicion. But there are moments of struggle when the mutual interests of workers are laid bare, and when the suspicion is finally turned in the other direction—at the plutocrats who live well while the rest of us suffer. The key question is whether or not in those moments of struggle a coherent political analysis of society, oppression, and exploitation can be articulated that makes sense of the world we live in, but that also champions the vision of a different kind of society—and a way to get there.

#### Surrendering to blackness does NOT entail losing a debate ballot nor deferring in policy judgments to any black person---we are self-interested actors AND we’re NOT giving you the ballot---in politics, surrender can only be forced through collective political power---just as we’d only accept a loss when delivered by a judge---proves our framework AND AFF are prerequisites to causing the surrender of whiteness through legal engagement---ironically, their demand is a liberal reinvestment of hope in white ethical redemption---BUT ours is NOT, merely pragmatic utilization of the tools available in ways which do not inhibit their performance of the alt.

Zeus Leonardo & Angela P. Harris 13, Leonardo, Department of Education, University of California-Berkeley; and Harris, Department of Law, University of California-Davis, 9-26-2013, “Living with racism in education and society: Derrick Bell’s ethical idealism and political pragmatism,” Race Ethnicity and Education, 16(4), Taylor & Francis

When it comes to the apprehension of white supremacy, Bell is arguably at his best. He starts from the basic premise that racism is a relation based on the assertion of white lives over all others, ‘the sense that as whites, they are entitled to priority and preference over blacks’ (31). Not far off from George Lipsitz’s (1998) claim that whites benefit from raciology, or race logic (see Gilroy 2000), and on whose possessive investment it depends, Bell is clear that white America is parasitic upon its black counterpart; the nation preaches ‘accepting black contributions and ignoring the contributors. Indeed … had black people not existed, America would have invented them’ (27). One might take Bell’s conclusion to its logical end to argue that both race and blackness are invented constructs (cf. Lott 1999). Whiteness’s will to invention, driven as it is by an objective to exploit, is largely responsible for the continuing significance of race. In this project, racial minorities are participants but only insofar as they answer racial interpellation as a way to mobilize against racism (Leonardo 2011). Never underestimating the history of white power, Bell (1992a) writes, ‘Slavery is, as an example of what white America has done, a constant reminder of what white America might do’ (12). Too focused on the urgency of the project to spend his time grieving, Bell defies ‘common sense’: We must see this country’s history of slavery, not as an insuperable racial barrier to blacks, but as a legacy of enlightenment from our enslaved forebears reminding us that if they survived the ultimate form of racism, we and those whites who stand with us can at least view racial oppression in its many contemporary forms without underestimating its critical importance and likely permanent status in this country. (12) Known more popularly as Bell’s ‘racism is permanent’ thesis, this call is an ethical invitation for blacks and whites alike to fight against racism, untethered by the hope that it will one day subside. In fact, as Bell’s (1992a) allegorical tale of the ‘Space Traders’ makes clear, white America has repeatedly tried either to expurgate or eject the black body from US territory. Bell testifies to black folks’ resourcefulness in finding a way to exist, if not thrive, in a condition that thwarts their survival. His work underscores bell hooks’ insight (1992) when she peers into public representations of blackness: ‘we see that we are in trouble’ (6; italics in original). In the end, the cause has nothing to recommend it, other than a simple ethical imperative to do right by others. In fact, with some 500 years of genocide, land takeover, and slavery, empirical evidence is on Bell’s side that racism is likely a permanent fixture of US national development. Bell’s insistence on ethical action guided by a regulative ideal informs his political appeal for change. It is not change in the sense of a resolution he seeks, but a revolution guided by principle, even the occasional school principal. It is idealist in the hopeful sense without the metaphysical excess of utopianism. Bell recognizes that ‘we need not embrace the liberal hope that someday all racial discrimination will go away to move to challenge discrimination in the here and now’ (Harris 2008, p. 69). Indeed, grounded in realpolitik, Bell shows little patience for reforms guided by the hope of one day ending racism. To be real?: political pragmatism in Bell’s work Perhaps because of the very stringency of Bell’s ethical idealism, the more influential legacy of his work may be its aspect of hard-headed pragmatism. Bell’s notion of ‘racial realism,’ and his principle of ‘interest-convergence,’ like his ethical idealism, stem from the position that, given that American society is founded on white supremacy, racial justice for non-whites is impossible unless it also serves white interests. This position thrusts advocates into politics – the art of the possible – and urges them to be clear-eyed realists about the compromises they make, rather than living in the fantasy that someday racism will cease to exist. Take, for example, Bell’s assessment of Brown v. Board of Education. The case looms large in the American legal canon as the moment when the Supreme Court, pressed into a corner by the NAACP’s legal strategy of insisting on equality in segregated facilities and institutions, finally admitted the truth: Jim Crow segregation was an expression of white supremacy. In a dramatic moment, the Court, under the direction of Chief Justice Earl Warren – no bleeding-heart liberal – repudiated Plessy v. Ferguson and acknowledged that in the American South, separate was not and could not be ‘equal.’ Brown was not only a symbolic victory, moreover. Following its decision in the case, the Court issued a series of per curiam decisions without a written opinion, striking down de jure racial segregation in a wide variety of social contexts, all based on the authority of Brown. The decision thus represents a dramatic turning point in American racial history: the crumbling of the old regime of post-Civil War white supremacy. The decision in Brown no doubt inspired thousands of idealistic young people to go to law school in the hopes of using law to bend the arc of history more quickly toward justice. Yet, more than 50 years after 1954, elementary education remains dramatically racially segregated. Perhaps more important, the goal of a decent education for every child seems as far off as ever. And Bell saw this coming for a long while. In 1976, his Yale Law Journal article, ‘Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,’ took note of ‘the increasing opposition to school desegregation at both local and national levels (not all of which can now be simply condemned as racist), while the once vigorous support of federal courts is on the decline’ (471). Bell also noted the presence of other troubling realities: ‘inflation makes the attainment of racial balance more expensive, the growth of black populations in urban areas renders it more difficult, an increasing number of social science studies question the validity of its educational assumptions’ (471). Yet, Bell observed, civil rights lawyers were pressing on with their objective of ‘unconditional integration,’ and in the process leaving behind their clients – parents who simply wanted a good education for their children, not a shining moral victory that might be achieved long after those children had graduated. Bell saw this not only as a problem of professional ethics, but as a failure to recognize ‘the real evil of pre-Brown public schools: the state-supported subordination of blacks in every aspect of the educational process’ (487). Bell continued: Racial separation is only the most obvious manifestation of this subordination. Providing unequal and inadequate school resources and excluding black parents from meaningful participation in school policymaking are at least as damaging to black children as enforced separation. (487–488) He suggested that ‘[l]ow academic performance and large numbers of disciplinary and expulsion cases are only two of the predictable outcomes in integrated schools where the racial subordination of blacks is reasserted in, if anything, a more damaging form’ (488) Today, of course, statistics on the percentage of black schoolchildren, especially boys, subjected to discipline, tracked into special education, and pushed into the ‘school-to-jail pipeline’ confirm Bell’s worst fears (see Winn 2010). Three years later, Bell’s reflections on Brown led to one of his most influential formulations: the idea of ‘interest-convergence.’ In his 1980 article, ‘Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,’ written for a symposium commemorating the 25th anniversary of Brown, Bell took the view that ‘school desegregation has in large part failed.’ Beyond the problems of implementation, Bell saw a deeper reason for its failure: Whites may agree in the abstract that blacks are citizens and are entitled to constitutional protection against racial discrimination, but few are willing to recognize that racial segregation is much more than a series of quaint customs that can be remedied effectively without altering the status of whites.… Whites simply cannot envision the personal responsibility and the potential sacrifice inherent in [the] conclusion that true equality for blacks will require the surrender of racism-granted privileges for whites. (1979, 523) Bell concluded that the true ‘neutral principle’ supporting the Court’s decision in Brown was not ‘racial equality,’ since whites were not in fact committed to this, but another principle, whose elements: …rely as much on political history as legal precedent and emphasize the world as it is rather than how we might want it to be. Translated from judicial activity in racial cases both before and after Brown, this principle of ‘interest convergence’ provides: The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites. However, the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper class whites. (523) With these calm but cutting words, Bell parted company with his white liberal colleagues, such as Professor Charles Black, who had sought to defend the decision in Brown in idealistic terms. He then expanded on how the decision in Brown fostered the interests of ‘middle and upper class whites’: First, the [Brown] decision helped to provide immediate credibility to America’s struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third world peoples.… Second, Brown offered much needed reassurance to American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World War II might yet be given meaning at home.… Finally, some whites realized that the South could make the transition from a rural, plantation society to the sunbelt with all its potential and profit only when it ended its struggle to remain divided by state-sponsored segregation. Thus, segregation was viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the South. (518–519) Bell argued that the interest convergence principle explained not only the outcome in Brown, but the judicial backpedaling that followed it in the 1970s, which intensified in the 1980s and 1990s as middle- and upper-class whites perceived race-conscious affirmative action policies as a threat to their own ‘opportunity hoarding.’ He concluded that the best way for black parents to achieve ‘educational effectiveness’ for their children was to stop pursuing racial balance and to focus instead on the elements of a good education, which for Bell included the creation and development of ‘model,’ all-black schools, thereby lending support for Du Bois’ (1995) call for an education that is relevant for black folks, which retains the character of the race. Bell’s interest convergence principle dovetails with what he came to call ‘racial realism.’ In 1992, Bell proposed that blacks needed to let go of the desire to be fully accepted and embraced in America as the equals of whites. He offered a statement that, in his view, ‘many will wish to deny, but none can refute’: Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary ‘peaks of progress,’ short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it and move on to adopt policies based on what I call: ‘Racial Realism.’ This mind-set or philosophy requires us to acknowledge the permanence of our subordinate status. That acknowledgement enables us to avoid despair, and frees us to imagine and implement racial strategies that can bring fulfillment and even triumph. (1992b, 373–374) For Bell, adopting racial realism meant that ‘[w]e need a mechanism to make life bearable in a society where blacks are a permanent, subordinate class’ (377). But this view of what it means to be a ‘realist’ has been contested. Bell is part of a cadre of scholars for whom white supremacy is a continuing reality, despite the nation’s embrace of civil rights and racial equality as ideals (Mills 1997; Bonilla-Silva 2001; Leonardo 2004; Gillborn 2005; Feagin and Elias 2012). As Mills notes, however, even naming the problem as ‘white supremacy’ is controversial among race scholars. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, for instance, argue that a commitment to racial realism entails an acknowledgement that racial identities are ‘unstable’: [R]aces are not teams; they are not defined solely by antagonism to one another. They vary internally and ideologically; they overlap and mix; their positions in the social structure shift; in other words they are shaped by political conflict. (2012, 4) Defending their work against an attack by Joe Feagin, Omi and Winant argue that the gains of the Civil Rights Movement were real and significant and that ‘the US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways’ (6). Similarly, Ian Haney Lopez (2006) proposes that ‘white domination’ is a more accurate term than ‘white supremacy’ to describe the present moment, acknowledging the defeat of white supremacy as an explicit ideology. Bell, however, as Omi and Winant recognize, is in a different camp, both with respect to the nature of white supremacy and the stability of racial identities. Bell has always been a ‘race man,’ seeing the world in black and white. While other critical race scholars have deplored the ‘black/white paradigm’ and sought to develop theories that incorporate indigenous peoples and Asian and Latino immigrants into their theories of race, Bell’s work is resolutely focused on African Americans. His view of the United States is consistent with his view of history, in which American national identity was forged alongside, and through, the invention of ‘whiteness,’ a category created as the opposite of ‘blackness.’ This view of American race relations is vividly dramatized in what is perhaps Bell’s most famous fable, ‘The Chronicle of the Space Traders.’ In this story, alien spaceships enter earth’s atmosphere on January 1, 2000, and the delegates from the stars offer the US everything the nation desperately needs: …gold, to bail out the almost bankrupt federal, state, and local governments; special chemicals capable of unpolluting the environment, which was becoming daily more toxic, and restoring it to the pristine state it had been before Western explorers set foot on it; and a totally safe nuclear engine and fuel, to relieve the nation’s all-but-depleted supply of fossil fuel. In return, the visitors wanted only one thing – and that was to take back to their home star all the African Americans who lived in the United States. (Bell 1992a, 159–160) The rest of Bell’s heartbreaking tale traces the political debates and legal machinations that slowly grind to an inevitable conclusion: On Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, January 17, 2000, ‘[h]eads bowed, arms now linked by slender chains, black people left the New World as their forebears had arrived’ (194). Positioned as the very last chapter in the book, the story forcefully articulates the Bell-Feagin position: black people never have been, and never will be, full members of American society. Who are the real realists here? Omi and Winant argue that ‘resistance is not futile,’ and suggest that it is Feagin’s, and Bell’s, stark view of race relations that is truly unrealistic. In a dramatic moment in their essay, they cry: Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always-absurd color categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of color? Or our white students for that matter? (11) Perhaps, however, this is a classic glass half-full, half-empty dilemma. Rather than adjudicate between them, we might represent Omi and Winant, on one hand, and Bell, on the other, as the Weber and Marx of race scholarship. As Weber’s work focused on the status relations among classes, Omi and Winant’s ‘racial formation theory’ focuses on the constantly shifting status relations among racialized groups and the politics of the rise and fall of racial projects. Their account of American racial history is divided into phases that take the US from racial domination to racial democracy (Omi and Winant 1994). Bell’s principles of ‘interest convergence’ and ‘racial realism,’ in contrast, concentrate from beginning to end on whites and blacks as two classes whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to one another – a kind of dialectical racialism in which two ‘race-classes’ exist, the tension between them forming the motor of history. As in Marx’s theorization of capital versus labor, this antagonism may produce complex and shifting political struggles, but the underlying dynamic has remained unchanged since slavery. Although it is certainly open to criticism regarding the failings of binary thinking, this view does make room for the existence of non-black and non-white races, just as Marx’s theory recognized the presence of the middle class to which he belonged (cf. Leonardo 2012).3 Nevertheless, Bell’s dialectical approach is clearly to be distinguished from Omi and Winant’s quasi-Weberian framework, which focuses on dispersal, status hierarchies, and an ever-shifting series of racial ‘projects.’ Taking this view, Bell’s and Omi and Winant’s positions are complementary rather than conflicting

. Bell’s racial realism reminds us that race relations are, at the end of the day, a hierarchy, not the fluid contestation that Omi and Winant’s focus on instability might suggest. In focusing on black and white, Bell also anchors discussions of American race relations firmly in history (though his elision of indigenous identity and the dynamic of ‘savagery’ versus ‘civilization’ that characterized white–Indian relations from the founding is troubling). Omi and Winant, however, add complexity and dynamism to Bell’s static view of race relations. They attend to different realities, but both are ‘realistic.’ Where Marx saw capitalism as inherently unstable and looked forward to its eventual demise via the revolution of the proletariat, Bell treats white supremacy, as we have seen, as permanent. The only practical game in town, therefore, is either to convince whites that racial justice is in their own self-interest, or to focus on black separatism and self-determination. For Bell, moreover, white self-interest needs to be defined materially; in this strand of his work, the liberal dream of convincing white people that they would be morally and spiritually uplifted by letting go of racism, is foolish. This is an important point because the abstract appeal to increase white humanization through anti-racism is contradicted by the material loss they must be prepared and willing to take on. That is, recovering a lost white humanism is symptomatic of a certain interest convergence wherein white anti-racism is guided by a discourse of ‘gain’ (this time whites’ sense of their humanity), which is part of the original problem within racial accumulation.

#### Poetics cannot translate into praxis or break out of the system Moten criticizes – it’s too sweeping and oppositional of a category to be effective

Katja Čičigoj 14, Stefan Apostolou-Hölscher and Martina Ruhsam, The Inflexions of the Undercommons, Lingering Ghosts: (Un)Answered Questions, (Un)Present Speakers, (Un)Read Books and Readers?, <http://www.inflexions.org/radicalpedagogy/n8_tangent_cicigojapostolou-holscherruhsam.html>

What are the Undercommons then? In their groundbreaking essay The University and the Undercommons Harney and Moten describe a tendency that is not only valid for the contemporary academia in the US but has also been unfolding on a rather international level, the latest since the Bologna reforms were decided by 29 European ministers of education in 1999. Harney and Moten paradoxically identify the idea of universitas as such with its professionalization and thereby – being inspired by the operaist assumption that living labor would always be creative whilst capital could only react to its inventions – juxtapose the mass intellectuality of what they call the Undercommons with a privatization of (knowledge) practices through their imprisonment inside the walls of the academia: “The Universitas is always a state/ State strategy,“ they claim. In comparison the Undercommons as maroons rather act against their administration by state apparatuses. PERSISTENT QUESTIONS– 1. ONTO-METHODOLOGY: creation of concepts (D&G): theory/philosophy as poetic practice versus a scientific attitude of understanding the world - raised as a problem of metaphoric poetic language, this may be more than a mere question of rhetorics: PHILOSOPHICAL-POLITICAL POIESIS can amount also to the CREATION OF POLITICAL IMAGINATION against “capitalist realism” - i.e. recognizing the immense political productivity and creativity of innumerable practical readings of concepts such as the Multitude, the Commons, and the Empire from Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt or performativity from Judith Butler – regardless of what our theoretical assessment of them might be in terms of how much they “scientifically” can correspond to concrete social realities. - so what is the poetic practice of the Undercommons as a concept? Can we envisage its political poesis (and how to think of it in this temporal order, if the Undercommons is always already here – see next point)? 2. EPISTEMOLOGY/POLITCS: Where and how can we find/see the Undercommons at work? If they are always already here, they risk becoming ubiquitous and we risk not to spot them... And on the other hand – why should we spot them at all, if they are always already here? - There seems to be an onto-political tension between “THE ALWAYS ALREADY” and “the contrary to what is”: between assigning value to the potential of what is already (the undercommons of study as always already going on) AND DEMANDING A RADICAL CHANGE OR BRAKE, infrastructural change etc. (for if what we are looking for is already here – it seems we necessitate no political work anymore) Does the recognition of the “always already” of the undercommons call for being complemented by political work on what is not (yet)? Can we think of these two attitudes together, but not merely in terms of a complementary “peaceful coexistence”? Can they inform each other – and how? About the Undercommons as Being... Always Already There “They saw our bad debt coming a mile off. [...] Anywhere bad debt elaborates itself. Anywhere you can stay, conserve yourself, plan. A few minutes, a few days when you cannot hear them say there is something wrong with you.” The Undercommons – Against Politics? The intentional work of subjects towards a clear goal: “Our task is the self-defence of the surround in the face of repeated, targeted dispossessions through the settler’s armed incursion. And while acquisitive violence occasions this self-defence, it is recourse to self-possession in the face of dispossession (recourse, in other words, to politics) that represents the real danger. Politics is an ongoing attack on the common – the general and generative antagonism – from within the surround” […] We surround democracy’s false image in order to unsettle it. Every time it tries to enclose us in a decision, we’re undecided. Every time it tries to represent our will, we’re unwilling” (Harney & Moten 17-19). An abdication of political responsibility? OK. Whatever. We’re just anti-politically romantic about actually existing social life. We aren’t responsible for politics. We are the general antagonism to politics looming outside every attempt to politicise, every imposition of self-governance, every sovereign decision and its degraded miniature, every emergent state and home sweet home. We are disruption and consent to disruption. We preserve upheaval. Sent to fulfil by abolishing, to renew by unsettling, to open the enclosure whose immeasurable venality is inversely proportionate to its actual area, we got politics surrounded. We cannot represent ourselves. We can’t be represented.” 3. THE INFORMAL/The need of FORMATION/DIS-/RE-FORMATION: – “the informal” is proposed by Harney and Moten as a way of thinking about the Undercommons; but when reflecting back on the specific conference set-up and how it worked out in the end in terms of in-forming the way our discussions proceeded, it struck me how perhaps what we think of as “the informal” is always already in-formed by pre-formed relations and positions (also in the specific case of this conference, but not only): how therefore a mere “via negative” of formal openness might not be enough for everyone to feel addressed and included (does everyone need to be addressed and included at all, however, or are we bound to always form specific regimes of address and inclusion/exclusion?) - The question might therefore not be how to form the informal (paradox?), but how can a pre-formed and informed “informal” set-up be dis-formed and re-formed otherwise in order to enable i.e. an emergence of a situation of study? - Is study really “the informal” or does it need some kind of form-ation to take place, to enable a study to occur? Is study itself a kind of dis- and re-formation, neither the formation ex nihilo, nor the creation of a supposed informal? 4. (IM)PATIENCE AND (LACK OF) RESULTS: - Bojana Kunst asked – why do we seem to be very patient when discussing the minute theoretical discrepancies, but impatient when faced with concrete practices and propositions? - To bring it further, does this indicate our inability to cross contextual boundaries or is there something inherent in contemporary modes of power operations that makes us prone to abstract assessment but reluctant to concrete propositions (unable to go “beyond the symptom”)? - Randy Martin asked whether our inclination towards self-assessment makes us perhaps too impatient to see and produce results. How to enable the afterlife of the conference to linger? Cartography of Symptomatic Developments and Problems

#### The Aff essentializes black experience via ideological projection instead of empirical polticial inquiriy which creates false consciousness

Adolph Reed 18, September 2018. Professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. “The Trouble With Uplift.” No. 41. https://thebaffler.com/salvos/the-trouble-with-uplift-reed.

The notion that black Americans are political agents just like other Americans, and can forge their own tactical alliances and coalitions to advance their interests in a pluralist political order is ruled out here on principle. Instead, blacks are imagined as so abject that only extraordinary intervention by committed black leaders has a prayer of producing real change. This pernicious assumption continually subordinates actually existing history to imaginary cultural narratives of individual black heroism and helps drive the intense – and myopic – opposition that many antiracist activists and commentators express to Bernie Sanders, social democracy, and a politics centered on economic inequality and working-class concerns. Class Is Dismissed The striking hostility to such a politics within the higher reaches of antiracist activism illustrates the extent to which what bills itself as black politics today is in fact a class politics: it is not interested in the concerns of working people of whatever race or gender. Indeed, a spate of recent media reports have retailed evidence that upper-class black Americans may be experiencing stagnant-to-declining social mobility – which is taken as prima facie evidence of the stubbornly racist cast of the American social order: Even rich professionals like us, elite commentators suggest, are denied the right to secure our own class standing. It is also telling that the study that provoked the media reports – Raj Chetty, et al., “Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective” – rehearses the hoary recommendation that “reducing the intergenerational persistence of the black-white income gap will require policies whose impacts cross neighborhood and class lines and increase upward mobility specifically for black men.” These include “mentoring programs for black boys, efforts to reduce racial bias among whites, or efforts to facilitate social interaction across racial groups within a given area.” That’s pretty thin gruel, warmed over bromides and all too familiar paternalism and no actually redistributive policies at all. In this context the pronounced animus trained on the figure of the “white savior” emerges as litmus test for the critical role of racial gatekeeper in respectable political discourse. The gatekeeping question has, for more than a century, focused on who speaks for black Americans and determines the “black agenda.” And the status of black leader, spokesperson, or “voice” has always been a direct function of contested class prerogative, dating back a century and more to Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, Ida B. Wells, and Anna Julia Cooper. Specifically, the gatekeeping function is the obsession of the professional-managerial strata who pursue what Warren has described as “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” How do “black leaders” become recognized? The answer is the same now as for Washington in the 1890s; recognition as a legitimate black leader, or “voice,” requires ratification by elite opinion-shaping institutions and individuals. Gatekeeping hasn’t been the exclusive preoccupation of Bookerite conservatives or liberals like Du Bois. Even militant black nationalists and racial separatists like Marcus Garvey and the leaders of the Nation of Islam have pursued validation as black leaders from dominant white elites to support programs of racial “self-help” or uplift. From Black Power to Black Lives Matter, claimants to speak on behalf of the race have courted recognition from the Ford Foundation and other white-dominated nonprofit philanthropies and NGOs. And the emergence of cable news networks and the blogosphere have exponentially expanded the number and types of entities that can anoint race leaders and representative voices. This new welter of platforms and voices seeking to promulgate and validate the acceptable terms of black leadership has made the category seem all the more beyond question, as black racial voices pop up all over the place all the time. So, for example, the self-proclaimed black voice Tia Oso was brought front and center in the 2015 Netroots Presidential Town Hall featuring Martin O’Malley and Bernie Sanders, where she proclaimed that “black leadership must be foregrounded and central to progressive strategies.” Likewise, the presumed moral authority of race leadership enabled Marissa Johnson and Mara Jacqueline Willaford to prevent Sanders from speaking at a Social Security rally in Seattle – as though the long-term viability of Social Security were not a black issue. The instant recourse to a posture of leadership is how random Black Lives Matter activists and a vast corps of pundits and bloggers are able to issue ex cathedra declarations about which issues are and are not pertinent to black Americans. Voices in a Political Vacuum The freelance black leader – and its more recent, superficially more pluralist incarnation, the black “voice” – is a legacy harking back to the era of massive black disfranchisement at the end of the nineteenth century. It also has drawn considerable staying power from the amorphous concept of “race relations,” according to which, in the judgment of historian Michael R. West in his 2006 study The Education of Booker T. Washington, “blacks and whites – or ‘black America’ and ‘white America’ – are basic, indivisible units of political interest. . . . The race relations framework appealed to white elites because it sidestepped the troublesome fact of blacks’ constitutional claims to full and equal citizenship by proposing a focus on the evanescent issue of how the ‘races’ relate as an alternative to matters like denial of rights and equal protection under the law.” West also notes that “interests and aspirations of politicians and ministers, workers and businessmen, parents and teachers would no longer be expressed by way of the normal, if potentially messy, institutional channels through which Americans settled their conflicts and competition. Instead, they would be mediated through the good offices of ‘Negro leaders,’ ever mindful of where their mandate comes from and the requirement placed on them as a first principle ‘to cement the friendship of the two races.’” The warrant to cement the friendship of the races, of course, meant framing racial comity on terms acceptable to the dominant white elites who ratified claims to black leadership and decided which of those claims were “responsible” or “right-thinking.” The race-relations mindset also shaped the ideological outlook of racial advocacy and uplift groups like the National Urban League and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Both groups, for example, were hesitant to support labor organization for black workers during the Great Depression since they relied on donations from liberal funders steeped in anti-union sentiments; also, apostles of racial uplift tended to come from a professional-managerial background themselves, again highlighting the extent to which there has always been a class dimension to black politics. None of this is to suggest that claimants to race leadership even in the Bookerite era were dupes or supplicants who were not sincerely committed “race men” and “race women” in the parlance of the time. Rather, as Warren, West, and others have argued, the stratum of the black population that tended to incubate aspiring race leaders also cohered around views of proper racial agendas – what the “race” needed and how its position in the world could be advanced, i.e., what constituted “uplift” – that also reflected the priorities of philanthropic elites. These mutually dependent groups were likely to share a baseline sense of how American society should be structured – and specifically of how to manage existing class hierarchies so as to better navigate blacks’ place within them. That said, most racial advocates were doubtless more committed than their patrons to the pursuit of full equality of opportunity. The Revolution Will Be Televised The terms of this tacit social contract shifted with the victories of the civil rights movement and the cultural insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s; suddenly, raw racial subordination no longer commanded uncritical assent from the liberal wing of the American power elite. At the same time, though, this civil rights revolution and its aftermath worked to obscure the striking continuity in the underlying socioeconomic dynamics that continue to validate race leaders, spokespersons, or representative voices. The open – or at least public – performance of supplication before powerful elites is no longer necessary or desirable for validation. Indeed, Black Power “militancy” and various cultural-separatist projects aligned with black nationalism supported new claimants’ discourse of authenticity – one that gained wider credence via assertive demands for equal power instead of humble requests for recognition. On the surface, at least, it now appeared that the essentially dependent relation between white liberal arbiters or power and their black counterparts had morphed into something more radical. And this new assertive liturgy of dependence works to the benefit of both grantors and grantees of political legitimacy and economic largess – players who all shared a stake in projecting an appearance of the anointed’s racial authenticity. Today, this liturgy is everywhere on display – along with the same power dynamics that sustain it. In academic institutions and programs, op-ed pages, magazines and blogs, and of course cable television newschat programs, we see a steady stream of racial voices and leaders plotting out the permissible boundaries of black authenticity and black leadership values. This surface accord within the charmed circle of soi-disant black leaders reinforces the illusion, just as was the case in the aftermath of the civil rights era, that they have all emerged from the grassroots. The increasing significance of the corporate newsfotainment industry means that things could scarcely seem otherwise to most casual viewers and audiences. The leading platforms of respectable black discourse – including the various internet platforms that encourage freelance chatter – reinforce the sense that those purporting to express the black point of view arise naturally from within the quasi-mythic “black community.” But of course the immediacy of all these venues, despite their many claims to have vanquished old-guard “gatekeepers” and “legacy media” forums, has rendered the selection processes behind the elevation of this or that leadership “voice” almost completely opaque. Not all points of view can gain a hearing, after all. Terms like “responsible” and “right-thinking” seldom slip into public discussion anymore because they evoke explicit subordination; nevertheless, sporadic calls for recognized black voices to distance themselves from “extremist” or otherwise unacceptable views expressed by other black “voices” – most recently via another predictably vile anti-Semitic utterance from Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan – reveal that such criteria are critical in setting the boundaries of public legitimacy for aspiring black leaders. Another telling instance of the same dynamic ocurred when Keith Ellison, the African American Muslim congressman from Minnesota, sought to chair the Democratic National Committee as a Sanders supporter; here again, the sensible centrist consensus counteroffensive depicted Ellison as simply too fringe and divisive a figure to command authority in the sacred political mainstream. Alongside the close vetting of respectable black voices in the media mainstream there’s been a prolonged atrophy of popular political mobilization behind issues of economic equity for black Americans. Taken together, these trends have opened a shortcut path to broader public recognition for self-styled race leaders. For more than a decade, it has been common to encounter young people who enter graduate programs in order to prepare for careers as racial voices or “public intellectuals,” hoping to obtain a credential that can procure valuable space on the Huffington Post, the root.com, or MSNBC. In the quest for mediagenic legitimacy, some eager race pundits have launched organizations that are barely more than letterhead or résumé entries; these feints are likewise often accompanied by Potemkin-style protest activism, including many of the donor-driven groups aligned with Black Lives Matter, or glorified photo-ops intended to evoke mass agitation. Among this cohort of racial voices, the essential qualification for recognition seems to be inclination to declaim on the intractability of an undifferentiated, ahistorical racism as a fetter on all black Americans’ life chances across the sweep of the nation’s history. As a corollary, they’re required to insist that objection to generic racial disparities constitutes the totality of black political concerns. Reduced and Abandoned The politics thus advanced is profoundly race-reductionist, discounting the value of both political agency and the broad pursuit of political alliances within a polity held to be intractably and irredeemably devoted to white supremacy. This fatalistic outlook works seamlessly to reinforce the status of racial voices who emphasize the interests and concerns of a singular racial collectivity. Central to these pundits’ message is the assertion that blacks have it worse, in every socio-cultural context that might be adduced. This refrain is also consistent in two important ways with the reigning ideology of neoliberal equality. First, the insistence that disparities of racial access to power are the most meaningful forms of inequality strongly reinforces the neoliberal view that inequalities generated by capitalist market forces are natural and lie beyond the scope of intervention. And second, if American racism is an intractable, transhistorical force – indeed, an ontological one, as Ta-Nehisi Coates has characterized it – then it lies beyond structural political intervention. In other words, Coates and other race-firsters diminish the significance of the legislative and other institutional victories won since Emancipation, leaving us with only exhortations to individual conversion and repentance as a program. This is why, for example, Coates and other proponents of reparations seem unconcerned with the strategic problem of piecing together the kind of interracial popular support necessary to actually prevail on the issue. Such problems do not exist for them because the role of the representative black leader or voice is precisely to function as an alternative to political action. Instead, the order of the day is typically to perform racial authenticity in a way that doubles as an appeal for moral recognition from those with the power to bestow it. Winning anything politically – policies or changes in power relations – is not the point. That is why the jeremiads offered by contemporary racial voices so commonly boil down to calls for “conversations about race” or equally vapid abstractions like “racial reckoning” or “coming to terms with” a history defined by racism. The black leadership role was always at best an accommodation to disfranchisement, going back to its first modern incarnation with Booker T. Washington and his cohort of racial advocates. It is a politics of elite transaction. That is not in itself necessarily a bad thing – President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “black cabinet,” or Federal Council of Negro Affairs, advised him on matters related to black Americans. But unlike today’s freelance racial voices, they were administration functionaries, and most had standing in racial advocacy, education, labor, and government institutions prior to joining the “cabinet.” The backdoor dealings between King and Johnson during the Selma campaign that DuVernay found too messy to include in her portrait of King’s heroic persona were also part of mundane political maneuvering, the inside-outside game of institutional politics. King and the SCLC, like FDR’s black cabinet, had constituencies that underwrote their standing as representatives of racial interest – which in turn gave them leverage to make political demands and pursue policy agendas. A. Philip Randolph used the March on Washington Movement to pressure President Roosevelt in 1941 to issue “Executive Order 8802,” prohibiting racial discrimination in the national defense industry. Randolph, Bayard Rustin, the Negro American Labor Council, and others organized the 1963 March on Washington as part of an inside-outside strategy to build support for a jobs program and passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. All this painstaking political effort could not be farther from the careerist pursuits of contemporary racial voices, whose standing depends entirely on the favor of powerful opinion-shaping elites in corporate media and elsewhere. Thus, for example, Touré Neblett and others in MSNBC’s stable were unceremoniously expunged from the lineup of talking heads when the network reconfigured its marketing priorities. More dramatically, Melissa Harris-Perry, apparently believing that her viewing audience gave her leverage, openly rebuffed the network’s demand to reorient her program to fit in with its election coverage. In short order, she and her program vanished without a trace from its schedule. Such incidents, and scores of others like them, make it indelibly clear where the lines of authority run when it comes to winning elite-media recognition as a black voice. For Their Own Good The race voices I’ve discussed express a particular class perspective among black Americans, one that harmonizes with left-neoliberal notions of justice and equality. That harmony may help explain why those racial voices – like the black political class in general – are so intent on disparaging the social-democratic politics associated with Bernie Sanders, even though a 2017 Harvard-Harris survey found that Sanders was far more popular with African Americans than with any other demographic category except declared Democrats. He boasted a 73 percent favorable rating among black voters – higher than his approval numbers among Hispanics, Asian-Americans, and considerably higher than those for whites or even 18-34 year-olds. This disjunction between popular opinion and the priorities of the black chattering class underscores the extent to which the racial programs and priorities advanced by those recognized black voices remain much as they were in the Age of Washington. Now as then, we have a leadership stratum dedicated to the class-skewed pursuit of “managerial authority over the nation’s Negro problem.” And the net effect of this top-down model of black discourse is to tether a politics of racial representation to the ruling-class agendas that generate and intensify inequality and insecurity for working people across American society, including among the ranks of black Americans. Black Clintonites, like Congressmen John Lewis (D-GA), James Clyburn (D-SC) and Cedric Richmond (D-LA), all clearly displayed this commitment during the 2016 Democratic primaries when they attacked Sanders as “irresponsible” in calling for non-commodified public goods in education, health care, and other areas. Richmond’s rebuke was especially telling in that he couched it in terms of his role as chair of the Congressional Black Caucus and the group’s “responsibility to make sure to know that young people know that” a social-democratic agenda is “too good to be true.” Richmond’s invocation of civic instruction for the young may be revealing in another way. Lurking beneath that piety is the deeply sedimented common sense of underclass ideology, which posits a population mired in pathologies and hemmed in by an overwhelming racism, and the corollary of interventions aiming to enhance capabilities for individual mobility. (It is, indeed, this same tacit rhetoric of permanent crisis that fuels the notion that black young people must be raised on a diet of inspirational movies.) This vision of unyielding black pathology is yet another testament to the harmony of antiracist and neoliberal ideologies – and it, too, harks directly back to the origins of the black leadership caste at the dawn of the last century. Washington and Du Bois, together with Garvey and other prominent racial nationalists, envisioned their core constituency as a politically mute black population in need of tutelage from their ruling-class-backed leaders. Touré F. Reed persuasively argues that the mildly updated version of this vision now serves as an essential cornerstone of the new black professional-managerial class politics. Underclass mythology grounds professional-class claims to race leadership, while providing the normative foundation of uplift programs directed toward enhancing self-esteem rather than the material redistribution of wealth and income. Exhortations to celebrate and demand accolades, career opportunities, and material accumulation for black celebrities and rich people – e.g., box office receipts for black filmmakers or contracts and prestigious appointments for other well-positioned black people – as a racial politics are consistent with the sporadic eruptions of “Buy Black” campaigns since the 1920s and 1930s. Such efforts stood out in stark contrast to more working-class based “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns that demanded employment opportunities in establishments serving black neighborhoods. Like “Buy Black” campaigns, which seem to have risen again from the tomb of petit-bourgeois wishful thinking, projections of successes for the rich and famous as generic racial victories depend on a sleight-of-hand that treats benefits for any black person as benefits for all black people. This brings to mind comedian Chris Rock’s quip that he went to his mailbox every day for two weeks after the not guilty verdict in the O.J. Simpson murder trial looking for his “O. J. prize,” only to be disappointed. Pain and Proprietorship At times, this tendency to absorb the plural into the singular can be strikingly crude and transparently self-interested. The torrent of hostility directed at Rachel Dolezal for having represented herself as black rested on groundless – sometimes entirely made up – claims that she had appropriated jobs, awards, and other honorifics intended for blacks. In addition to the annual contretemps over whether blacks win enough of the most prestigious Oscars, recent racial controversies in the art world illustrate how easily the narrowest guild concerns can masquerade as burning matters of racial justice. The Brooklyn Museum’s hiring of a white person as consulting curator of African art sparked objections that the hire perpetuated “pervasive structures of white supremacy in the art field.” The 2017 furor over the Whitney Biennial’s display of Dana Schutz’s “Open Casket” – inspired by the infamous 1955 photograph of Emmett Till’s brutalized body – reduced to a question of ownership of “black suffering,” or more accurately, of the right to represent and materially benefit from the representation of black suffering. The protesters’ objection, as Walter Benn Michaels put it succinctly, was that “black pain belongs to black artists.” It’s worth noting that one of the leading critics of the painting and its display was Hannah Black, who contended that “non-black people must accept that they will never embody and cannot understand” the gesture Till’s mother, Mamie, made in insisting on an open-casket funeral. Black, who not only called for the painting to be removed from display, but also offered an “urgent recommendation” that it be destroyed, is a Briton who lives in Berlin. From a different standard of cultural proprietorship, one might argue that Schutz, as an American, has a stronger claim than Black to interpret the Till story. After all, the segregationist Southern order and the struggle against that order, which gave Till’s fate its broader social and political significance, were historically specific moments of a distinctively American experience. In fact, most claims of cultural ownership and charges of appropriation are bogus. While sometimes they provide an instrumental basis for tortious claims, as in pursuit of restitution for Nazi and other imperialists’ looting of artifacts, more often they posit a dead-end conflation of fixed and impermeable racial identity with cultural expression. As Michaels has argued for more than twenty-five years, the discourse of cultural ownership stems from the pluralist mindset that treats “culture” as a key marker of social groups and thereby inscribes it as racial essentialism. In order to legitimate what Michaels describes as “racial rent-seeking,” a curiously inflexible brand of race-first neoliberalism has taken root in American political discourse, proposing a trickle-down model of racial progress, anchored in the mysticism of organic black community. Against this exoticized backdrop, neoliberal race leaders stage the beguiling fantasy that individual “entrepreneurialism” is the key path to rising above one’s circumstances – i.e., the standard American social myth that obscures the deeper need to combat systemic inequalities. The most tragic, and pathetic, expressions of this faith are the versions of the “gospel of prosperity,” which fuse pop self-realization psychology and a barely recognizable Christianity to exploit desperation and the desire for life with dignity and respect among their black-majority congregations. The false hopes of the prosperity gospel encourage already vulnerable people to fall prey to all sorts of destructive get-rich-quick schemes; they are the “sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions” channeled through a market-idolatrous Protestant psychobabble. Black ministers and other proponents of entrepreneurialist ideology as racial uplift also played a largely unrecognized role in pushing subprime mortgages, and even payday loans, in black communities. The racial trickle-down success myth is partly a vestige of an earlier era, during which individual black attainments could be seen as testaments to the race’s capacities – and a refutation of the white-sanctioned view of black people as generally inferior. Even then, however, this model of black uplift was enmeshed in the race theory of the time – notably the belief that a race’s capacities were indicated by the accomplishments of its “best” individuals – and it was always inflected with the class perspectives of those who saw themselves as such individuals. The class legacies of this foundational moment in modern black politics may well contribute to the firm insistence among today’s “black voices” that slavery and Jim Crow mark the transcendent truth of black Americans’ experience in the United States – and that an irreducible racism is the source of all manifest racial inequality. That diagnosis certainly masks class asymmetries among black Americans’ circumstances as well as in the remedies proposed to improve them. Nevertheless, we continue to indulge the politically wrong-headed, counterproductive, and even reactionary features of the “representative black voice” industry in whatever remains of our contemporary public sphere. And we never reckon with the truly disturbing presumption that any black person who can gain access to the public microphone and performs familiar rituals of “blackness” should be recognized as expressing significant racial truths and deserves our attention. This presumption rests on the unexamined premise that blacks share a common, singular mind that is at once radically unknowable to non-blacks and readily downloaded by any random individual setting up shop as a racial voice. And despite what all of our age’s many heroic narratives of individualist race-first triumph may suggest to the casual viewer, that premise is the essence of racism.

#### Politicizing identity in individual debates fails---it relies on elite driven essentialism that is ultimately conservative. The more productive focus would be changing the parameters of debate in democratic forums.

Avigail Eisenberg 11, Victoria political science professor, Identity Politics in the Public Realm, pg 1-28)

Not surprisingly, a large and growing scholarly literature about identity politics has now emerged. To oversimplify, we find two broad literatures in the field. First, normative political philosophers have written extensively about what we might call the ethics of identity claims, exploring how claims • to the recognition and accommodation of identity relate to broader principles of justice, freedom, human rights, and democratic citizenship (see Appiah 2005; Gutmann 2003; Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994; Tully 1995). The goal, in this literature, is to deploy these moral principles in a way that enables us to distinguish those identity claims that advance core values of freedom and justice from those identity claims that threaten or jeopardize these values. With some notable exceptions (Barry 2001), this literature has been generally sympathetic to at least some manifestations of identity politics. Political philosophers have offered a wide range of arguments to explain why people have a strong sense of identification with their languages, cultures, territories, and religions and how this identification can generate legitimate claims that have too often been ignored or suppressed in contemporary nation-states. Indeed, these claims can be seen as advancing principles of freedom and equality by remedying unjust forms of disadvantage or oppression that have historically limited the freedom and equality of members of these groups. Identity has proven to be a revealing and helpful way to track social exclusion and institutional bias. And the recognition of identity is generally considered an important means to according respect to others (Copp 2002; Eisenberg 2009; Moore 2006; Taylor 1994). In these ways, the normative literature reflects the view that a politics sensitive to considerations of identity can promote justice and emancipation. Second, we have a more empirical literature - largely emerging from the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, and political science - that attempts to explore the social and political processes that actually underpin the politicization of identity groups. In this literature, the focus is often on the role of elites in organizing and mobilizing identity-based political movements. Political movements are rarely, if ever, the spontaneous and unmediated expression of grassroots feelings of injustice. Elites typically play an important role in deciding a movement's goals and tactics. And if we attend to these elite strategies, it becomes clear that identity claims are often shaped - and distorted - by intragroup and intergroup power dynamics. At the intragroup level, for example, elites may frame the group's traditions or culture in such a way as to preserve their own power and authority against potential challenges from inside or outside the group. They may say that they represent the authentic views of the community while dismissing their critics within the group as alien or disloyal. In the name of fighting oppression and discrimination within the larger society, minority elites may reproduce oppression and discrimination within the group. At the intergroup level, minority elites may end up being co-opted by the state and offered positions of power and prestige that are personally rewarding but that hide ongoing processes of assimilation or exclusion of vulnerable groups. More subtly, elites may strategically reframe the nature of the group's identity to fit the established expectations of governments or international organizations or to respond to incentives made available by the larger political opportunity structure (James 2006; Jung 2008; Tilley 2002). Elites within immigrant groups, for example, decide whether to frame their claims in ethnic, racial, or religious terms, not based on which of these identities is most significant or authentic to group members (insofar as that can be determined), but rather based on which of these categories provides the most leverage within the larger legal and political system. Dominant groups are not passive in these processes. States often have an interest in seeing groups frame their claims one way rather than another, so as to justify responding to these claims with one set of policy instruments rather than another. For example, conflicts over practices that are deemed to be cultural are often dealt with through forms of intercultural dialogue that aim to find compromise solutions. In contrast, conflicts over practices deemed to be religious may lead to more litigious responses in which groups can invoke the protection of a constitutional right to freedom of religion. Group elites may actively reshape the group's identity to fit the preferred categories of the larger society - to make the group's identity seem more "safe" to the dominant society and to the values of the status quo. In short, empirical studies suggest that elites often act like entrepreneurs; engaged in a series of strategic, even opportunistic, decisions about how to mobilize identities in a way that enhances their status both within the larger; society and within the group they claim to represent. The politicization of' identity groups, on this account, is not only, and perhaps not primarily, an expression of a sincere desire by average members for greater recognition and respect of their identity in the face of discrimination and disadvantage, it is also a highly instrumental and opportunistic vehicle used by self-seeking elites. If normative political theorists focus on how identity politics can be a vehicle for the legitimate but heretofore unrecognized interests of vulnerable groups, empirical social scientists are more impressed by the way that identity politics can be a vehicle for more familiar interests in power and prestige. People may indeed have legitimate interests in their group identities, as normative theorists claim, but these interests may not be what actually underpin real-world political mobilization. Given its strategic and instrumental nature, identity politics may actually have perverse and harmful effects - indeed, harmful effects precisely on people's identity. The Risks of Identity Politics Empirical studies point to a number of risks or perverse effects commonly associated with the political mobilization of identity groups. It is worth spelling these risks out in greater detail (also see Eisenberg 2009, 58-63). First, as mentioned earlier, one risk is that identity politics will entrench existing hierarchies within minority groups. When the demands of identity groups lead to policies more respectful of group identity, group elites may come to feel emboldened and encouraged to exert pressure on their members to respect traditional lines of authority and follow conservative group practices that have been endorsed by accommodation measures in the public sphere. Conversely, when groups are not accommodated or when they are required to reform their practices, identity politics can trigger a cultural defensiveness or re-activism, which also reinforces the power of conservative elites who will encourage group members to strictly adhere to traditional markers of identity to shield the group from pressures exerted on it from outsiders (see Deveaux 2006, 14; Shachar 2001, 33, 35-37). Both of these perverse effects or risks are exacerbated by the tendency for identity politics to silence critics internal to groups who, in deviating from the traditional group edicts, are more likely to appear culturally disloyal• (see Shachar 2001, 6, 61) and more likely to be criticized by group elites as disloyal or apostatic. The risk of entrenching existing group hierarchies thus arises because of a set of internal group dynamics that depend on public authorities taking group identity seriously. Second, also mentioned earlier, there is the risk of co-optation. Minority elites may end up being co-opted by the state, offered token positions of power and prestige that hide ongoing processes of assimilation or exclusion of vulnerable groups. In this case, identity politics appears, at best, to provide Band-Aid solutions to deeper social problems, including racism, poverty, and dispossession. In a political context in which public authorities are more receptive to claims that are framed in-terms of identity, at-risk groups will repackage their claims in the hope that doing so will provide them with some security, protection, or at least a modicum of additional resources. For example, school boards may commission the writing of a high school text geared towards minority students rather than providing minority-dominated schools with a fair share of public resources. Several studies of Aboriginal political activism in Canada also raise the concern that successful attempts to frame indigenous claims in terms of identity may end up undermining the political and legal legitimacy of the broader project of indigenous people to secure their right to self-determination. In both cases, the risk of cooptation is that identity politics at best secures for vulnerable groups minor adjustments to existing state policies while, at the same time, it diverts the group's resources from political struggles more directly relevant to addressing their broader interests. These risks of entrenching intragroup hierarchies and intergroup cooptation are familiar and predictable once one acknowledges the strategic nature of elite entrepreneurs in identity politics. But there are other, more subtle, risks. A third risk is essentialism. To motivate identity-based claims and to persuade a skeptical dominant society, groups have• a natural tendency to insist that a particular practice is essential to their way of life. They support this claim on either historical grounds (that the practice has been part of the group's culture since time immemorial) or on religious grounds (that the practice is sacred). The result, in either case, may be to encourage especially narrow, stereotypical, and nostalgic understandings of what constitutes a given group's identity. Rather than protecting practices that function to enhance living and vibrant communities, it is not uncommon for public decision makers to endorse nostalgic cultural practices as emblematic of what constitutes the distinctiveness of a group's identity. Communities thereby become imprisoned by static and eventually constricting understandings of their identity or, at least, they enjoy cultural protections only as long as they adhere to the narrowly defined and potentially anachronistic practices that receive legal protection.2 This result may have perverse effects not only on how members of the group think about their practices - exaggerating their primordial or sacral nature - but also on how the larger society views the group-reinforcing stereotypes. Our understandings of Others are highly imperfect, based on crude stereotypes or unrealistic construal of culture, and a highly essentialist form of identity politics can feed into this. Studies have shown that when outsiders - for example, legislators or judges - try to understand the distinctive identity of an indigenous people, they often employ crude stereotypes and highly simplistic understandings ofAboriginality.3 Indeed, this can generate what might be called the perils of authenticity. In order to defend a certain understanding of their identity in a manner that they believe will be convincing to decision makers, groups may distort their identity or oversimplify their practices to meet the expectations they assume others have of them. Numerous anthropological studies show how groups perform their identities to meet the expectations of outsiders and do so in a way that essentializes, naturalizes, and reinforces the stereotypes associated with their identities (Povenelli 1998; Friedlander 2006; Merry 2001). And these perverse effects in turn raise more general worries about the effects of identity politics on intergroup relations and, indeed, on the very cohesiveness and stability of society. Identity politics may not only encourage stereotypical understandings of other groups but also lead to more damaging forms of group polarization. A common criticism of identity politics is that it undermines democratic community by encouraging people to identify and mobilize on the basis of what distinguishes them rather than what unites them (Miller 1995; Putnam 2007). Theorists of social capital have seized on this effect and argued that ethnic and religious fragmentation depletes social trust, thereby making cooperative relations among citizens more difficult to attain (see Wanen 1999). Perhaps even more seriously, some critics have argued that identity politics is uniquely corrosive of basic democratic virtues of public reason and compromise. According to this view, identity-based claims are both inherently opaque - incapable of being rationally debated - and inherently non-negotiable. The result is that identity politics tends to be a "deadly serious politics" (Waldron 2000, 158) played for high stakes by participants who are willing to present their particular interests as monolithic or non-negotiable even if this leads to democratic deadlock or, still worse, open hostilities (Weinstock 2006, 23). In light of these risks, it is unsurprising that the empirical literature offers a more skeptical view of the merits of identity politics. Some commentators argue that the emancipatory potential of identity politics is compromised, even negated, by these perverse effects. Normative theorists may be able to offer principled arguments in favor of identity-based claims, but the real-world dynamics of identity politics may be harmful to both intragroup and intergroup relations. In Ruud Koopmans' (2006, 5) words, "we cannot simply assume that what is normatively justifiable will also be practically efficient:' He worries that public policy has been unduly shaped by highly normative views about the justice of identity claims, while naively ignoring the real-world sociological dynamics generated by identity politics. Similarly, Anne Phillips (2007, 14) worries that while normative political theory presents identity politics as a "cultural liberator;' it too often in practice ends up as a "cultural straitjacket:' How Do Institutions Respond to the Risks of Identity Politics? In short, the existing literature in normative political philosophy and empirical social science identifies not only an emancipatory potential in identity politics but also a set of characteristic risks that accompany efforts to frame political struggles in terms of identity. If normative political theories help to explain why people can have legitimate interests in identity that give rise to valid claims .of justice, empirical social science helps to explain how that emancipatory potential can be subverted by the social, political, and legal dynamics that foster and channel identity politics. Faced with this dilemma, it is natural to wonder whether the potential benefits of identity politics are worth the risks. For many commentators, the risks are too great. In their view, the very logic of identity politics reinforces hierarchies, leads to essentialism and stereotyping, gives rise to the perils of authenticity, leads to co-optation, and displaces healthier and more democratic forms of class-based or interest-based politics. Political institutions, on this account, should be designed to discourage rather than enable or facilitate identity politics. In our view, this sort of sweeping condemnation of identity politics is both unrealistic and unwarranted. It is unrealistic because, as we noted earlier, identity politics is an enduring feature of democratic societies. It is not a new fad or fashion but has deep historical roots and will not disappear in the foreseeable future. But this condemnation is also unwarranted, because there is no single "logic" to identity politics that predetermines its political effects. Rather, the progressive potential of identity politics depends on a range of factors, and our aim in this volume is precisely to help identify some of these key factors. Although the empirical literature is in general more skeptical of the virtues .of identity politics, it is far from univocal on this point, and many studies of identity-based political movements have concluded that they have helped to redress injustice and to deepen democracy. In at least some times and places, the political mobilization of identity groups, even when it reflects the opportunistic behavior of ethnic entrepreneurs or involves attempts to co-opt minority groups with tokenistic forms of public accommodation, has operated to challenge injustices and to create inclusive and fair societies.4 Our goal is to try to identify some of the factors that either sustain or subvert the emancipatory potential of identity politics. In particular, we are interested in the role of public institutions in shaping the nature and outcomes of identity politics. We believe that the capacities and imperatives of public institutions, and of the agents who administer them, are vitally important in this regard. Whether identity politics has perverse effects depends, at least in part, on whether those, in charge of public institutions are aware of those potential effects and whether they have the desire and capacity to mitigate them. Identity politics may carry with it a range of characteristic effects, but precisely because these effects can be foreseen, public institutions can take steps to forestall them and can learn over time about how best to mitigate them. Of course, we cannot assume in advance that the decision makers within public institutions are either motivated by progressive goals or have the capacities needed to achieve them. State structures are not wholly impartial and omnipotent vehicles for implementing our ideal principles of freedom and equality. They, too, are heavily shaped by their own internal power dynamics. But the interests of public institutions may differ from those of other elites involved in identity politics, and they may serve as a check on the strategic behavior of both minority and majority elites. Public institutions are not merely the instruments of self-interested group elites seeking to preserve their powers and privileges, nor are they merely the instruments of an impersonal system of Foucaultian control. Public institutions have their own diverse (and conflicting) incentives and motives, which need to be considered when predicting the effects of identity politics. In particular, liberal-democratic states provide space for forms of political contestation, public deliberation, and legal reasoning that allow for identity-based claims making and that compel public institutions to develop procedures and guidelines for addressing such claims in ways that are compatible with the rule of law, constitutional principles, and public reason. Under these circumstances, the nature of public institutions plays a pivotal role in determining the outcome of identity politics. In some cases, public decision makers may lack the willingness or incentive to counteract the risks of identity politics - indeed, they may have a strong incentive to exacerbate some of those risks. For example, those who administer public institutions may have an incentive both to uphold and to co-opt unrepresentative minority leaders at the expense of a more inclusive or accountable leadership. But in other cases, particularly within liberal-democratic constitutional structures, public institutions may have the capacity, and indeed the obligation, to counteract processes of essentialization,-co-optation, fragmentation, or exclusion and to support instead more emancipatory forms of identity politics. So the question we are asking in this volume is not whether identity politics is to be avoided but rather how public institutions respond to this form of politics and what role they play in either exacerbating or mitigating the risks associated with it. This part of the story has been much less studied. There is an extensive literature in normative political theory on the justice of identity claims and an extensive literature on the internal dynamics and elite strategies of identity-based political movements. By contrast, we know surprisingly little about how public decision makers themselves - whether legislators, bureaucrats, or judges - respond to claims made by groups on the basis of identity. How do decision makers evaluate the merit of such claims, using what criteria? How do they evaluate the representativeness of elites who speak on behalf of groups? Are public decision makers conscious of the risks of entrenching hierarchies, essentialism, authenticity, cooptation, and fragmentation and, if so, how do they seek to respond to them? Do decision makers learn from cases in which these risks are misidentified or mismanaged? Can we find instances of social learning in which the characteristic dilemmas or dangers of identity politics have been recognized or remedied? Our aim in this volume is to better understand the nature of these institutional responses and thereby better understand the scope for a progressive politics of identity. We are interested in the different contexts in which these claims arise, the different sorts of actors that advance them, and the ways in which these factors affect the responses of public institutions. In what contexts, and in relation to which sorts of actors or claims, are public institutions most likely to either mitigate or exacerbate the risks of identity politics or to enable or undermine emancipatory claims making? Outline of Chapters To answer this question, we have drawn together studies from several different contexts in which a variety of identity claims are at stake. Our authors examine questions about the challenges of identity politics in relation to different types of groups (racial groups, indigenous groups, and religious groups), in relation to different types of policies and political contexts (the census, antidiscrimination policies, land claims; religious accommodation, and autonomy arrangements), and in different geographical contexts (East Asia, Africa, Latin America, the United States, and Canada). Although this volume obviously represents a small sample of the possible universe of cases, it offers a good first step in understanding the role of public institutions in this field. The volume opens with two chapters that focus on the ways in which public institutions make decisions about the identification of groups within the census. In Chapter 2, Melissa Nobles examines census politics in the United States and Brazil; in Chapter 3, Bruce Berman examines census politics in India and Africa. The census provides a particularly clear example of the need to understand the imperatives and capacities of state institutions. Indeed, as both authors point out, the initial impetus for categorizing groups in the census was not a bottom-up desire for recognition by identity groups, but rather a top-down desire by state elites to be able to consolidate control over the heterogeneous populations they governed. Naming and counting groups was necessary to enable the state to tax people and property, to conscript people into the army, to regulate mobility, and sometimes to engage in ethnic cleansing or even genocide. These long-standing purposes of census categorizations have generated, among some groups, a long-standing reluctance to be counted. Jews and the Roma, for example, have often opposed attempts to have their group identity recorded in the census. However, in recent years, the census has become a site within which many identity groups have sought recognition. To have one's group recognized within the census "is often seen as proof of acceptance and inclusion, as well as providing leverage for disadvantaged groups to demand a fairer share of public resources. These demands for inclusion in the census have generated a number of difficult challenges for public institutions: on what basis should decision makers decide which groups to include in the census? Nobles examines the way these decisions have been made in Brazil and the United States, focusing in particular on the changes postwar democratization brought to the ways in which census categories in both countries were defined and the purposes for which they were used. Whereas census categories were historically designed to support a racial order - the black white divide in the United States and the myth of a raceless society in Brazil - democratization led to two important changes. First, it has made these states more responsive to how citizens understand their own identities, requiring states to change their categories to better fit the self-identification of individuals. Second, the purpose of the census has changed from supporting a racist. social order. to supporting the aims of civil rights and antidiscrimination legislation. These are clearly positive developments but, as Nobles notes, they also raise certain dilemmas for the census process. The two developments may work at cross-purposes. Insofar as the census seeks to track the historical legacy of discrimination, it may need to continue to use the old racial categories that provided the basis on which blacks were discriminated against. Yet many blacks today wish to self-identify under other labels - for example, as mixed race. Using such categories may provide groups with a stronger sense of acceptance and recognition but make it harder to use census data to track inherited inequalities. Policy makers are faced with the dilemma of reconciling the desire of people to use categories that reflect their actual identities, without abandoning the project of accurately tracking patterns of racial disadvantage. As Nobles notes, this dilemma has been resolved in different ways in Brazil and the United States, and in each case, she argues, the resolution may be appropriate to the context. Berman's chapter offers a less optimistic account of census politics. Starting with the colonial era, he traces how census categories were de¬signed by state officials to facilitate bureaucratic control and impose racial¬ized social orders.• In this respect, the story is similar to Nobles' account of earlier stages in US and Brazilian history. However, Berman insists that this colonial-era history has imposed enduring constraints on how identity categories are organized today, and he remains skeptical that democratiza¬tion will lead towards a more benign or progressive use of group categories. Focusing on Africa, Berman demonstrates that, both in the immediate era of decolonization and in the more recent stage of democratization, ethnic entrepreneurs strategically deployed group categorizations - particularly categorizations of autochthony and indigeneity - to gain access to new sources of wealth, to protect their claims, to suppress internal dissent, and to exclude other citizens on the basis of ethnic difference. The risks of identity politics are fully on display in this context regardless of democratization, or perhaps because of it. Berman concludes wit# some sobering reflections on whether these pathologies should be viewed as a form of African exceptionalism or whether they, instead, reflect enduring risks that accompany iden¬tity politics in all contexts. The two chapters that follow focus on a closely related set of issues re¬garding the state's recognition of indigenous peoples. In many countries, and indeed under international law, indigenous peoples have a distinctive legal status that often confers special rights in relation to land, culture; and self-government. But the official recognition of distinctive status im¬mediately raises a pressing question: how do states decide which groups within a country qualify as indigenous? In Chapter 4, Villia Jefremovas and Padmapani Perez focus• on the recognition of indigenous • groups in the Philippines; in Chapter 5, Juliet Hooker examines the recognition of indi¬geneity in Latin America. As both authors note, the global trend towards the recognition of the rights of indigenous people since the 1980s is widely seen as one of the truly inspiring social movements of our time, providing em¬powerment to one of the most. disadvantaged and stigmatized groups around the world. Yet, here too, there are a number of dilemmas confronting public institutions that seek to recognize indigeneity, and these dilemmas have been handled differently in different countries. The Philippines offers an interesting case study because it is the• first country in Asia to adopt international indigenous rights norms, and it has developed concrete criteria for evaluating the claims of indigenous people. As with changes to the census in the United States and Brazil, this shift is intimately tied up with processes of democratization. Jefremovas and Perez trace a historical shift in the Philippines, from an undemocratic system of colonial control premised on ethnic and racial hierarchy to a more demo¬cratic, civil rights-based system of antidiscrimination and minority rights that seeks to recognize and empower indigenous groups. However, in the Philippines, as indeed in most countries in Asia, there is no obvious way of determining which of the dozens or hundreds of ethnic groups qualify as indigenous. To tackle this problem, Jefremovas and Perez show that the Philippines has, paradoxically, relied heavily on colonial-era anthropology. Nineteenth- and early twentieth-century anthropological texts are cited to¬day as providing key evidence about the nature of indigenous groups, includ¬ing their culture, practices, histories, and territories. This is paradoxical because colonial-era anthropology was fundamentally shaped by the very racialist and colonialist ideologies that historically justified the oppression of indigenous peoples. Yet, as the authors explain, indigenous people have come to 'rely on these categories and have adopted them in order to wage their political struggles. Categories that were once used to maintain a racial order are now the source of political mobilization and even group pride. At the same time, these categories carry liabilities in that they essentialize in¬digenous peoples and force them to articulate their claims within narrow and outdated conceptions of group culture and identity. Jefremovas and Perez trace this dilemma and search for an alternative approach that can ad¬dress the risks of essentialism without fragmenting communities and there¬by undermining their chance to respond to the injustice they have suffered. Hooker's chapter examines some of the same issues in the Central American context, focusing specifically on how public institutions in Nicaragua define indigenous identity. In a novel approach, Nicaragua de¬cided not to draw a sharp distinction between indigenous peoples and other minorities - particularly Afro-descendants -:- who often live in similar cir¬cumstances. Instead, it emphasized the common injustices they had faced and tried to build a form of regional autonomy in the Atlantic coastal region that empowered both. As Hooker presents it, this policy can be seen as re¬sponding to two of the main worries we discussed earlier. On the one hand, it seeks• to avoid the dangers of essentialism that plague many other at¬tempts to come up with a narrow definition of indigeneity. On the other hand, it also seeks to channel identity politics in a way that builds solidarity among different groups rather than dividing them. Yet here, too, there are dilemmas and paradoxes. Subsuming the claims of Afro-descendants and • indigenous peoples under the broader project of establishing a multiethnic regional autonomy has arguably enabled the central government to ignore the distinctive claims of both groups (e.g., in relation to land claims), as well as the historical patterns of exclusion arid dispossession. Regional auton¬omy avoids the pitfalls- of essentialism but also makes it more difficult to track historical patterns of inequality between identity groups. Subsuming these different claims has also created the possibility that this regional au¬tonomy will actually be dominated by members of the dominant society in Nicaragua - the mestizos - who have moved in large numbers to the region. Hooker concludes by speculating whether indigenous and Afro-descendant identities can be conceived in ways that recognize their distinctive and shared vulnerabilities while, at the same time, empowering them vis-a-vis the mestizo population The question of indigeneity is not simply a matter of categorization. Even when it is uncontroversial that public institutions should treat a partf group as indigenous, difficult questions remain• about how these 'i tions should conceptualize indigenous culture and identity. In Chap Avigail Eisenberg examines the manner in which domestic courts in C assess the identities of Aboriginal peoples and compares it to the way man rights bodies at the United Nations address this issue. As noted e fears of cultural essentialism are particularly salient in the context of digenous peoples, as are fears about co-optation. Many comrnenta worry that identity politics weakens political struggles for Aboriginal determination while raising the risks of essentializing and co-opti Aboriginal peoples. Eisenberg, however, argues that the comparison Canadian and international experiences shows that there are many ways institutions to mitigate these risks. The risks of identity politics, she argui arise.primarily because of the criteria used by public institutions to as these claims. Domestic courts in Canada use overly restrictive criteria that aim primarily at shielding the state from the threats or costs associated with1 these claims. In contrast, international norms tend to be more expansiv~j\_ adopt a future-oriented perspective, and require states to consult with in¬digenous groups. At least some of the risks of identity claiming can be miti¬gated when institutions adopt better criteria. The question, then, is whether public institutions have the capacity to reflect on and change the criteria that they adopt. Domestic institutionshave shown some openness to adopt¬ing international norms of assessment, especially the duty to consult. But insofar as their decision making continues to be directed by the state's nar¬row interests in protecting its sovereign interests, the risks associated with identity claiming will remain in place for Aboriginal peoples. This interplay of domestic and international factors is also a central theme in Victor Armony's chapter, w~ich examines the role of identity claims in the distinctive context of Latin American political cultures, with their universalistic, republican, formalistic, and centralist tendencies. He notes that the formalistic tendencies• of Latin American regimes make it more difficult for identity groups to gain official recognition of racial and ethnic discrimination. Where states deny that ethnic and racial differences exist, it is difficult to get effective political action to contest ethnic and racial discrimination. Under international pressure, however, various countries have adopted new policies for recognizing groups and for measuring inter¬group inequalities. Armony focuses in particular on Argentina, which in the wake of having signed international human rights agreements adopted a national plan to address ethnic discrimination in 2005. Yet, as Armony notes, human rights solutions supported by international actors often fail to reflect the complexities of local realities. The categories privileged by inter¬national actors, and their priorities, may be at odds with the often subtle and eomplex operation of intergroup dynamics at the local level. Racial categories operate very differently in Argentina than in the United States, for example, and international models based on the latter may not work in the - funner. At the same time, international actors• and transnational advocacy can have the effect of shedding new light on local situations, helping to mo¬bilize identity groups that suffer from discrimination and opening up previously closed political systems to participation from previously excluded and marginalized groups. In short, international actors can either exacerbate or mitigate the risks of identity politics. Armony concludes with some suggestions to build more constructive linkages. These first six chapters focus primarily on issues of race, ethnicity, and indigeneity. The final four chapters shift the focus to religion, which in many ways has become the most controversial and contested sphere of contem¬porary identity politics. In Chapter 8, Eleonore Lepinard examines the regu¬lation by state agencies of Islamic practices in France. In Chapter 9, Andre Laliberte examines the recognition of religious groups in East Asia; while in Chapters 10 and 11, Lori Beaman and Jocelyn Maclure examine recent debates about the reasonable accommodation of religious groups in North America. Lepinard's chapter discusses the interaction between two policy frameworks used in France to address the claims of minorities: a republican in¬tegration model focused on immigrants and a laicite model focused on religious groups. The former categorizes people primarily on the basis of ethnicity or country of origin and aims to ensure their integration into French citizenship - an integration that is assumed to require a degree of cultural assimilation. The latter, which evolved to resolve the historical conflict between secularists and Catholics in the early twentieth century, fo¬cuses on the idea of the religious neutrality of the state vis-a-vis the religious beliefs of citizens. As Lepinard shows, the integrationist objectives of the former have started to reshape the latter, leading to a more restrictive and assimilationist conception of laicite, particularly when applied to the grow¬ing number of native-born children of Muslim immigrants from• North Africa. Whereas older ideas of laicite were grounded in the idea of state neutrality, the newer conception of Iaicite also emphasizes ideas of social cohesion, public order, and a common civic culture - ideas drawn from the republican model of immigrant integration - and uses these ideas to re¬strict the public expression of religious beliefs and identities, particularly of Muslims. As a result, although we see a dear shift in the categories used by state institutions from immigrants (defined by ethnic origin and citizenship status) to Muslims (defined by religious affiliation) and, similarly, a shift in policy framework from immigrant integration to lakite, the effect has not led to a reduction in the assimilationist pressure facing minorities. As laicite is redefined to serve integi:ationist objectives, the space for Muslims in France to advance identity-based claims is shrinking. And yet Lepinan] also notes the emergence of a third framework, rooted in European antidis-crimination norms, that may yet serve as a counterweight, providing legal grounds for Muslims to say that the restrictions on their religious practices qualify under European norms as forms of discrimination. She concludes by noting that the future interaction between these three frameworks remains uncertain, leaving minorities in France with contradictory messages about how public institutions will respond to their identity claims. Laliberte's chapter examines recent changes in state policy regarding the recognition of religious groups in East Asia, focusing in particular on Taiwan. As with several other chapters, his analysis emphasizes how practi¬ces of group recognition have changed as societies have moved from more authoritarian approaches aimed at controlling civil society to more demo¬cratic ones aimed at recognizing and accommodating identity groups. But whereas democratization in the United States and Latin America has meant an increasing reliance on self-identification as a guide to policy, in Taiwan state policy remains closely tied to imported Western categories of religion. These categories are interpreted in a way that reflects a fundamentally Christian, congregation-based understanding of religious life - an under, standing that is singularly unsuited to the religious practices found in East Asia and that leaves many important forms of spirituality and religion un¬recognized. In this respect, as Armony shows, international influences have a potentially c;listorting effect on local realities. But Laliberte shows that it is not obvious how this dilemma can be addressed. The recognition of reli¬gious groups in East.Asia is not simply a struggle between the historical in¬ertia of identity categories and a newly democratic impulse towards self-identification. A deeper challenge comes from the unique characteris¬tics of religious identity in East Asia (and perhaps elsewhere). Religious af¬filiations and identities in Taiwan are remarkably elastic and porous and may simply be impossible to capture in official categories. This, of course, is a familiar critique of all identity categories, whether racial, ethnic, indigen¬or religious. But Laliberte's analysis suggests that the challenge of reli¬in East Asia may be distinctive, in ways that can inform our more J}leoeral theories about the preconditions of an effective and progressive bllentity politics. Beaman's chapter pushes this question of the relationship between indi¬"Widual identity and group categories further, focusing in particular on recent debates in Canada about the interpretation of freedom of religion. Courts in Canada and elsewhere have shifted away from group-based interpreta¬tions of religious identity and religious conflict to interpretations that rest on subjective, individualist, and lived understandings of religion. Religious freedom is not (simply) the freedom to do what group scriptures or group authorities say, but rather the freedom to do what the individual himself or herself sincerely believes, even if this belief diverges from the orthodox or traditional understanding of the group's faith. In Canada these shifts co- incide with the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 and with the entrenchment of multiculturalism several years before that, These shifts have created new possibilities for accommodating religious identi¬ties in a way that is more responsive to the diversity of faiths within contem¬porary society. However, Beaman holds that these shifts have raised their own dilemmas. The courts, she argues, have not found a neutral way to test the sincerity of an individual's beliefs, to assess the nature of harms caused by religious practices, or to assess what counts as a reasonable accommoda¬tion of religious belief. In all of these matters, the courts in Canada continue to privilege the views of the Christian majority, asserting a false neutrality that asks that minority groups adopt the religious norms of majorities. In light of these implicit biases, which are often• denied or hidden through of¬ficial discourses of secularism, the substantive equality of minority religions is significantly diminished. Beaman insists that public institutions, such as courts, must become more critically reflective of these biases. By contrast, Maclure's chapter offers a more optimistic analysis of recent shifts in the way courts evaluate religious claims. He argues that emerging doctrines of reasonable accommodation can lead to fair and equitable deci¬sions for religious minorities while; at the same time, mitigating the risks often associated with religious identity claims. Maclure argues that, in the case of religion, states are morally obliged to accommodate in order to pro¬tect religious equality and to respect the importance of conscience to reli¬gious believers. In particular, public institutions ought to follow two guiding norms when assessing religious claims: first, they should display sensitivity to the possibility that legitimate societal norms sometimes indirectly dis¬criminate against certain groups and, second, they should recognize the dis¬tinctive moral status\_ of the meaning-giving beliefs and commitments that religious believers assume. The question, of course, is whether courts• can apply these norms without generating the various perverse effects associ¬ated with identity politics. Maclure suggests that courts are aware of these risks and have attempted to address them by focusing on the sincerity of religious belief and on standards of reasonableness in relation to• claims for accommodation. Although there are no ironclad guarantees, he suggests that, over time, we are learning how to fairly accommodatereHgious identi¬ties without triggering the deadly serious pathologies of religious conflict. Lessons and Implications As the studies in this volume confirm, there is nothing new about identity politics. Political mobilization among, and conflict between, identity groups dates back to the very origins of the modern state, as long as peoples have been counted and categorized by a census. Identity politics is as deeply rooted in the political fabric of most societies as are their histories of settlement and nation building. Identity politics is not new and is not fleeting in significance. These studies also confirm that identity politics is, in the end, like most forms of politics, full of strategic and opportunistic actors attempting to advance their interests in the most effective ways they can. Yet, at the same time, identity politics has strong normative features, mobilizing deeply held beliefs and values in response to discrimination and disadvantage. These strategic and normative features are not mutually exclusive. Nor are they contradictory. Politics holds many examples of actors engaging in strategic, incentive-driven and opportunistic behavior in order to secure what is of normative value to them. In our view, the question is not whether identity politics is really about emancipatory movements for social justice or about the strategic self-interest of elites. It does not make sense to ask whether identity politics is really about grievance or about greed.5 Identity politics is always both normative and strategic. The question, rather, is whether we can draw any lessons about how to enhance the emancipatory potential of identity politics while minimizing its characteristic risks and perverse effects. This is a serious challenge, but it is important to emphasize that it is hardly unique to the sphere of identity politics. Similar challenges, arise in virtually all areas of democratic politics, whether in regard to class, or the environment, or gender. In all of these spheres, we find elite entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize grievance but doing so in an opportunistic way that runs the risk of entrenching inequalities and cooptation. Yet few people would suggest that we should therefore seek to minimize or abolish democratic mobilization around these issues. The remedy, rather, is to ensure that such political mobilization is subject to various, tests of publicity, democratic contestation, accountability, negotiation, and compromise, so as to enhance its ability to address legitimate grievances while minimizing the risks of abuse. In our view, we should follow the same basic approach when thinking about identity politics. If identity politics carries with it certain characteristic risks, we should address those risks through the familiar democratic remedies of publicity, accountability, contestation, and negotiation. Unfortunately, much of the literature on identity politics operates with a double standard. On the one hand, when diagnosing the risks, critics insist that identity politics is as subject to strategic behavior as any other form• of politics. Yet, when it comes to remedies, they write as if identity politics is uniquely incapable of being democratized, that it involves claims and values that are opaque and non-negotiable in ways not true of other sorts of claims, that identity politics is categorically different from interest-based politics precisely because it evokes deep-seated and enduring values rather than temporary material benefits, such that claimants are unwilling to negotiate or compromise on their claims. But there is an obvious inconsistency in this critique. If identity politics exhibits patterns of strategic and opportunistic behavior similar to other forms of politics, then it should be subject to similar remedies of democratic contestation, accountability, negotiation, and compromise. If we should not glorify identity politics as being somehow immune from strategic manipula­tion, then we should not demonize it as being immune from the processes of democratic accountability. Instead, the challenge is to understand how identity politics can be democratized, whether public institutions have developed effective means to respond to the risks of identity claims, and. Under what circumstances identity groups are likely to engage in democratic debate, negotiation, and compromise over their identity claims. With these questions in mind, the various chapters in this volume offer a rich set of cases for, reflecting on how institutions are able to identify and manage the risks associated with identity politics. We cannot hope to summarize all of the possible lessons and implications from these cases, but we would like to highlight four themes that we see as particularly salient throughout the different chapters. History Matters To begin, history matters to the emancipatory potential of identity politics, but it matters in ways that raise dilemmas for public institutions. As several contributors show, governments are often tied to the historical legacies of identity politics, and this is, in no small part, because identity groups have considerable• attachment to these legacies. In the Philippines, Taiwan, the United States, and throughout Latin America, identity categories used in the census, in public policies, and in constitutional provisions have existed for a hundred or more years. These categories form the historical basis upon which groups have organized and mobilized and, in some cases, have given rise to group pride and a sense of belonging, often regardless of the pernicious motivations behind their original design. So, even when the original intention behind the design of identity categories was to control indigenous populations or to facilitate racist segregation, these categories have over time become important to the organization of political life and the mobilization of democratic activity aimed at emancipation. Moreover, contemporary attempts to address discrimination or historical injustice often require being able to identify and target people according to the same categories that were used to discriminate against or exclude them in the past. Paradoxically, categories initially designed for oppression may provide a necessary basis for successful democratic engagement. At the same time as historical legacies provide a foundation for democratic engagement, however, they also constrain groups and public institutions in ways that may entrench group hierarchies and essentialize identities. Courts and legislators may reinforce static boundaries of group membership or stereotypes about group, practices, in some cases at the behest of groups that have mobilized to defend these identity categories and practices. In order to sustain group identity and strength, leaders may resist attempts by group members to develop more fluid or hybrid notions of membership that would more accurately reflect the nature of people's social attachments and identities. The boundaries that define the, group, unite it, and distinguish it from other \_groups are reinforced, and efforts to reconfigure group identity are rejected as forms of fragmentation or even disloyalty. For example, the internal diversity among blacks in the United States or Brazil is downplayed so as to avoid fragmentation, while the contrast between indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants is exaggerated, so as to preserve a strong sense of indigeneity. Similar problems occur in regard to group practices. Particular practices are advanced by elites as emblematic of the group's identity, partly to protect the group from, being fragmented but often also as a means to reinforce a definition of the group's identity that will justify the position of the elites as the appropriate representatives or protectors of that identity. In short, historical inertia has both the effect of helping to organize political life and mobilize groups so that they can wage struggles against discrimination and injustice and the effect of essentializing groups and entrenching group hierarchies by defining identity groups in static and stereotypical ways. History matters, but it poses a dilemma between empowering identity groups and exacerbating the risks of entrenching group hierarchies and essentializing group identities. International Influences The influence of international actors on local identity politics raises another kind of dilemma for public institutions. On the one hand, common sense suggests that decision making about the recognition of group identities must be sensitive to local realities. The historical record is full of examples of colonial powers imposing on vulnerable communities imperialist policies and governance structures that utterly failed to reflect - or failed even to try to reflect - local realities. Indigenous peoples in Africa, Canada, the United States, and many other places were counted and classified by colonial authorities in order to control them and to shape local identities to fit the political priorities of colonial regimes. This concern about the role of outside powers in classifying and controlling identity groups remains alive today, albeit in a rather different form. Today, the concern is that Western- . dominated international organizations are pressuring less powerful states to adopt particular conceptions of identity classification - including how racial divisions ought to be drawn in. the census, who should count as an Aboriginal or indigenous person, and how ethnic pluralism ought to be managed. This kind of international influence is sometimes seen as a new form of global imperialism whereby more powerful states implicitly or explicitly universalize their own policies regarding identity, treating their own folk categories of identity as if they were somehow universally valid (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998). On the other hand, because international actors are free of the constraints found at the local level, they often have less at stake than do local actors in upholding historical myths or in reifying existing identity categories and their corresponding elite hierarchies. In some cases, international influence on local policies provides perspective to local communities on just how mythic and conservative these policies are. In other cases, international actors can make national governments more sensitive to local groups, to the need to consult groups, or to the need to adopt less narrow and essentialized interpretations of a group's culture by alerting local populations to a different perspective more in keeping with emancipatory aims. Ironically, international actors can help national governments become more sensitive to local realities. International influence, it seems, is not intrinsically good or bad. An actor’s proximity to local circumstances can be both •an asset and the source of risk when it comes to the assessment and classification of identity groups. The question, then is what determines whether international actors contribute to or inhibit a more democratic form of identity politics. The answer surely depends, at least in part, on the motivation for international action in the first place. The motives behind the International Monetary Fund's activities in postcolonial Africa (discussed in Berman's chapter) surely differ from the motives of the UN Human Rights Committee in. assessing indigenous claims (discussed in Eisenberg's chapter). International organizations have a mix of motives - including concerns for international peace and security, economic development, and human rights - that often point in different directions on issues of identity politics. Forms of identity politics that may seem legitimate and desirable from a human rights perspective may nonetheless be seen by some international organizations as a threat to regional security or as an obstacle to rapid economic development. But another part of the answer depends on the, extent to which international organizations are themselves subject to appropriate forms of publicity, accountability, and contestation, allowing local actors to challenge hegemonic international presumptions about appropriate forms of identity politics. Democratic Engagement and Effective Participation One of the most striking conclusions suggested by the chapters in this volume is the central importance of democracy. The capacity of minority groups to influence state policies and to challenge state assumptions about the nature of their identities and• interests largely depends on whether the governance of identity is democratized. When identity groups become democratically engaged - both internally, in matters within their communities, and externally in the broader political community - they can mobilize their identities as a touchstone to wage struggles against discrimination and oppression. In many of the contexts studied• in this volume, groups have been able to negotiate, their identity claims democratically in a peaceful manner that exhibits a willingness to compromise rather than simply engage in inflated identity rhetoric and non-negotiable posturing. A key means by which groups have challenged state assumptions about their identities in the postwar period is by insisting on the principle of self-identification. We see this not only in the cases where efforts have been made to democratize the governance of identity (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Canada, and the United States) but also perhaps most vividly in the cases where democratization remains limited (e.g., in much of Africa and the Philippines). These examples show that the risks associated with identity politics are greatest where citizens are unable to effectively contest how the state governs their identity. Elite manipulation, essentialism, co-optation, and fragmentation are problems where people have little choice but to fit themselves into pre-given, rigid identity categories that are then used to advance static or elite-inspired ideas about what counts as group interests. Even within consolidated democracies, there are important variations in the extent to which particular decision-making forums are open to participation and contestation. Various chapters suggest that the risks of essentialism and stereotyping are exacerbated in nonparticipatory, judicially driven decision making, especially decision making controlled by local and national elites. Legal processes can have the effect of privileging conservative definitions of groups and their practices and shielding such definitions from contestation both within the group and outside it. This is especially a problem when courts feel bound to defend narrow legislative agendas that are wedded to recognizing minority identities in anachronistic or stereotypical ways or that are set by legislators who are themselves responding to heightened public anxieties regarding minority rights. Decision making that is more open to minority group consultation and participation offers fewer opportunities to ignore the variety of interests within the group and internal disagreement among group members about how identity values ought to be prioritized and protected. More open processes of decision making and consultation are better able to shine light on potential abuses of power. But, at the same time, open and democratized processes do not resolve all the dilemmas associated with identity politics. Democratic values and impulses themselves often pull in competing directions. Democratization enables people to challenge inherited categories and to insist on the principle of self-identification, which ensures that identity categories more accurately reflect people's actual identities. Yet democratization also. involves a commitment to equality through the rectification of inherited inequalities, and this in turn may require the ability to track inherited patterns of discrimination and disadvantage by counting people on the basis of inherited categories. An approach to identity groups that rests solely on the principle of self-identification, and on freeing individuals from imposed categories, may have the perverse effect of rendering racial and ethnic inequality officially invisible. Democratization cannot fully resolve this dilemma, which is itself the product of democratization. Just as democratization is not always the answer, less participatory forums for decision making are not always a liability for identity politics. Courts and other judicial bodies provide controlled environments in which the considerable risks of identity politics may be exposed and mitigated. As many of the chapters in this volume show, courts are often called upon to assess the validity of identity claims, with mixed results. Such assessments sometimes fail, either because courts rely too, heavily on conservative views about minorities already entrenched in law and politics or because legal processes rely too heavily on the knowledge and discretion of judges, who are overwhelmingly members of the majority elite whose perspectives may reflect broader public stereotypes and misinformation about minorities. Yet, at the same time, judicial bodies have considerable power and potential to provide public guidance to other institutions and to more public and participatory forums about the values and questions that ought to guide a normatively defensible assessment of identity claims." Legal reasoning is open to critical reflection, and in democratic societies, courts are obligated by constitutional principles to reflect on whether the• principles they apply treat the diversity of citizens as equals. Judicial bodies can outline a public method of decision making that is attentive to the risks of identity politics, that is able to navigate these risks in relation to the specific groups and circumstances before them, and that can outline an even-handed way of assessing identity claims without capitulating to every claim made in the name of identity. So the potential is great for judicial forums to play a leading role in democratizing the assessment of identity claims. But this potential is often unrealized, which perhaps explains the ambivalence in minority rights scholarship regarding legal forms of decision making as a means to resolve -identity-based conflict. Yet most of our case studies trace ways in which identity groups have been inadequately consulted in decision making, denied opportunities to contest the ways that national or international actors delimit their identities, and are underrepresented in the judicial or legislative bodies within which crucial decisions about their freedoms are made. The conclusion to draw from these cases is that the risks and dilemmas of identity politics signal not a failure of identity politics per se but a failure of states to democratize their political processes. This failure is highlighted, not created, by identity politics. Identity politics - like class politics, gender politics, or youth politics - is not the sort of thing that fails or succeeds independently of the values that guide it. The emancipatory potential of any form of politics depends on the extent to which democratic norms and processes inform the ways in which interests are formulated and decisions are made both within groups and in the broader public sphere. What has come to be criticized as the failure of identity politics is often, instead, the failure of seemingly robust and resilient democratic processes to ensure that historically excluded and disadvantaged minorities have adequate opportunity to participate in decision making and that decision making is open to sincere consideration of the values and beliefs related to their identities. Identity politics often exposes the inadequacy of existing democratic processes by pointing to the ways in which forums of decision making fall short of their democratic promise. Institutional Reflexivity One final conclusion to draw from these studies is that public institutions are not passive sites or repositories for the challenges and risks associated with identity politics. Institutions have grappled for a long time with many of these challenges and, in some cases, have found ways to discourage opportunistic identity claims and avoid their perverse effects. We see this clearly in institutional responses to religious identity claims in the last thirty years. In the past, courts often invoked essentialist assumptions about what it means to be a member of a particular group. More recently, however, courts have shifted to a new approach - illustrated by the sincerity criterion used by Canadian courts - which provides a broad ambit for protecting religious identity while allowing variation in how believers practice their beliefs. The adoption of the sincerity criterion aims to privilege more subjective and lived understandings of religion while undercutting the legal sanctity of canonical interpretations of the faith (and hence of the religious elites who define this canon). Similarly, decision makers in census bureaus have learned how to allow for self-identification in the census, just as jurists have learned how to broaden the definition of culture in international legal guarantees for cultural rights. These developments have proven enormously helpful in providing greater opportunities for people to pursue the legitimate interests associated with their identities, without being tied to essentialist and static notions of who they are and what interests they are supposed to have as members of defined groups. At the same time, many of our case studies show that institutions are not always successful at addressing the risks or resolving the dilemmas of identity politics. This is true of courts, which have had limited success in realizing an egalitarian understanding of freedom of religion or designing criteria for the assessment of Aboriginal identity that avoids the risks of cultural essentialism. More broadly, it is also true of public institutions within societies, such as Africa, where problems of ethnic fragmentation and entrenched elite hierarchies seem to overshadow the possibilities democratization has offered in other contexts. A key concern is that few if any Western democracies have established transparent and reasonably justified criteria that can be used by courts and legislatures to guide their assessments of claims made by minorities for the accommodation of a practice important to their identity. One of the most common concerns about how public institutions assess the practices of minorities is that decision makers are not objective but rather use their own personal biases or misinformation to guide their decisions (see, for example, Phillips 2007; Renteln 2004; Volpp 2000). This is often invoked as an argument against multiculturalism, but countries that have weak or no multicultural policies may actually do worse in this respect. Where states have weak multicultural policies, or where they have policies directed at ignoring the relevance of race or religious identity in decision making, public agencies are less likely to have institutional memory, publicized best practices, or documented experiences to draw on in assessing the identity of religious believers or ethnic minorities. In the absence of transparent guidelines or established best practices, public officials employ their discretion. James Beckford and colleagues offer a good example in their comparative study of Muslims in French and British prisons (Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar 2005). Whereas the code of criminal law in France recognizes that prisoners have the right to practice their religion (subject to reservations about security and good order), it does not offer any criteria for deciding what counts as religion. Administrators therefore must decide this question for themselves. Beckford relates a story of asking a French prison director why Catholic nuns were permitted to wear their distinctive veils when they served as chaplains or chaplaincy volunteers in prisons when Muslim women were not allowed to wear a headscarf. The director's answer was that the clothing of nuns was "traditional"• and therefore permissible anywhere in a prison, whereas the clothing of Muslim women was "religious" and therefore impermissible in the public areas of prisons because of la'icite (ibid., 117-18). \_The personal discretion of prison directors has led to inconsistent policies for accommodating Muslims in French prisons and usually a denial of opportunities for collective prayers or meetings with imams, which causes re-sentment among prisoners. One result is that French prisons experience greater religious radicalism among Muslim prisoners today than do British prisons. This is hardly surprising given that, in the absence of access to prayer sessions and imams from the external community, French prisoners are forced to practise their religion individually and secretly, and extremists among them are given free rein to influence other prisoners. In the absence of well-established criteria in French prison regulations for what counts as a religious belief or for how to assess requests for accommodation from in¬mates who are believers (other than by denying these requests), decision making about matters related to religious identity proceeds on the basis of personal discretion. The chapters in this volume make clear that institutions such as courts and legislatures struggle with the risks and challenges of identity politics at different rates of success. Although in some cases improving the institutional capacity to reflect on identity claims requires clear and fair-minded guidelines, in other cases improvement requires institutions to be more open to people who are drawn from minority ranks. As several chapters show, state elites tend to deny or ignore the ways in which existing rules and practices continue to privilege dominant groups and to disadvantage minority groups. In other cases, the success or failure of institutions to respond effectively to the risks and challenges of identity politics seems to depend on the clarity and nature of institutional aims. Where identity claims are interpreted with emancipatory aims in mind, such as responding to discrimination or historical disadvantage, the risks and challenges of identity politics are easier to meet. Where institutions are instead motivated by their own strategic concerns -: such as protecting the colonial privilege of one group, enjoying favorable status with particular allies, or bending to the demands of powerful interest groups - identity politics become distorted and confining. Many of the risks of identity politics flow from these kinds of distortions, which could be avoided if states were more responsive to the democratic and emancipatory aims of identity politics. These concluding reflections on lessons learned are clearly only a first step towards developing a more systematic account of how public institutions deal with identity claims. Given our relatively small and .heterogeneous set of cases, our main aim is to identify some promising lines of inquiry, which we hope will inspire further research in this area. Indeed, if the vari¬ous chapters teach us anything, it is precisely the contingency and diversity of institutional responses to identity politics. There is no preordained logic that determines whether public institutions will enhance or inhibit the emancipatory potential of identity politics. These outcomes will depend on the democratic agency of citizens and the capacity of institutions to learn from their own successes and failures.

# 1NR

#### Specifically, true of racist violence—it is overdetermined by class antagonism which only solidarity can solve---EVEN if they win Anti-blackness came first

R.L. Stephens 17, labor organizer in Chicago and the founding editor of Orchestrated Pulse, “The Birthmark of Damnation: Ta-Nehisi Coates and the Black Body”, https://www.viewpointmag.com/2017/05/17/the-birthmark-of-damnation-ta-nehisi-coates-and-the-black-body/)

Both Coates and Wilderson speak of power in terms of dreams. Coates writes of monolithic white “Dreamers,” those whose investment in the American Dream requires a faith in their own whiteness. Similarly, Wilderson sees America as enacting two distinct dreams. For Wilderson, “the dream of black accumulation and death” is separate from “the dream of worker exploitation.” Ultimately, in both Coates’s and Wilderson’s respective frameworks, solidarity is unimaginable and class struggle is rendered futile. Though Coates does not go to the lengths Wilderson does to position himself in opposition to materialist politics, the result is effectively equivalent: a separation of race and class combined with a deep skepticism of class-based solidarity, reforms, or even revolution. This is a deviation from the Freedom Tradition embodied by Fannie Lou Hamer. For her, the problem of racism wasn’t cosmology or ontology, it was an expression of politics implicated in class antagonism. Fannie Lou Hamer stood “with the masses,” both white and black. Solidarity through struggle from below — class struggle — formed her path to victory. Coates’s ontological pivot is more muddled than Wilderson’s. Fleetingly peppered throughout his work are allusions to material reality, betraying the superimposition of metaphysical abstraction that ultimately drives his perspective. “We did not choose our fences,” he writes. “They were imposed on us by Virginia planters obsessed with enslaving as many Americans as possible.” Coates knows that Virginia planters did not invent gravity or earthquakes. Yet this historicizing impulse does not prevent him from essentializing racism when he confronts it head on. In [string of tweets](https://twitter.com/tanehisicoates/status/804400275872161792) from December 2016, Coates conceded that racism is not transcendental, noting that “at its very root it was always economic.” But acknowledging racism’s economic impact has not led him to embrace class struggle. Even Frank Wilderson can acknowledge that racism has an economic impact, but he still believes that class struggle and racism exist on distinct planes. Coates holds a similar belief; that racism is wholly different in kind from class. In the same series of tweets, he concluded that “in America, ‘class’ isn’t the only kind of class.” Just as he mystifies racism, even while locating its impact in the bodies of Black people, here he once again performs a muddled ontological pivot. Coates cannot address material politics on its own terms, preferring instead to retreat to a contrived mystification. He replaces action with interiority. As he [recently told](https://dailynorthwestern.com/2017/01/31/campus/journalist-ta-nehisi-coates-discusses-trump-race-in-america/) an auditorium of eager Northwestern students, “The process should not be… people looking out at the world and saying, ‘I would like for there to be change in the world, how do I do that?’” Instead, he implored the crowd to engage from the “inside-out, not outside-in… because if you are in the business of justice, and making this society more democratic, you might get a lot of disappointment.” Consciousness matters, of course. “Baby you just got to love ’em,” Fannie Lou Hamer would say of the white segregationists who routinely threatened her life. “Hating just makes you sick and weak.” This was Hamer in a reflexive moment, but it was no retreat. In the very next breath, she warned, “I keep a shotgun in every corner of my bedroom and the first cracker even look like he wants to throw some dynamite on my porch won’t write his mama again.” Fannie Lou truly was her mother’s daughter. Reflection, whether through intergenerational story or her own thoughts, enhanced her resistance. The same cannot be said of Coates. Instead of in political action, Coates finds relief in a cookout at Howard’s homecoming, surrounded by Blackness. He fantasizes that he is “disappearing into all of their bodies,” as the music and dancing, the Black cultural zeitgeist of the moment, cure him of the “birthmark of damnation.” The curse is lifted. Blackness is transfigured, becoming a space “beyond the Dream.” It’s another ontological pivot, this time allowing Coates to conclude that The Mecca’s cookout has a “power more gorgeous than any voting rights bill.” It’s a fantasy of retreat, as if Black culture were beyond the machinations of capitalism, as though Black cultural expression existed in the world but was not of it. Between the World and Me concludes with Coates considering climate change. He sees climate change as a manifestation of a polluted white consciousness, rather than the unfettered excess of industrial capitalism. It is a “noose around the neck of the earth,” allegedly resulting in large part from white flight, the mid-century exodus of negrophobic white families to the suburbs and the pollution caused by the cars that took them there. Coates’s words here are poetic, but grossly inaccurate. They mimic Afro-Pessimism’s emphasis on the white libido, relegating his rhetoric to the realm of interior life, the souls of white folks, and stopping well short of the political domain. To Coates, climate change is “more fierce than Marcus Garvey” — a reflection of Coates’s pessimism. For Coates, the Civil Rights movement was not a struggle to alter a material world; rather the “hope of the movement” was merely to “awaken the Dreamers.” Black politics is only relevant as far as it can arouse white consciousness, which he sees as a largely futile exercise, due to “the small chance of the Dreamers coming into consciousness.” Coates sees common interest between the Black elite and the Black poor, as he marvels at “the entire diaspora,” from lawyers to street hustlers, present at Howard’s homecoming. Yet he cannot conceive of anti-capitalist class solidarity across racial identity. He has a darker vision, of a kind that Corey Robin has [described](http://www.chronicle.com/article/How-Intellectuals-Create-a/234984) as “apocalypticism.” Coates’s ultimate hope is not in collective human action, but rather the total annihilation of the world and all those living in it— another feature that unites him with Afro-pessimism, which calls explicitly for the “end of the world.” As he says of the Dreamers, “the field for their Dream, the stage where they have painted themselves white, is the deathbed of us all.” Paradoxically, though he can see a collective fate in apocalypse, he rejects shared struggle for liberation. “The Dreamers will have to learn to struggle themselves,” he declares. The problem is, the whole of capitalist enterprise, both past and present, cannot be reduced to race as Original Sin, and its poisoning of all existence. Left out of Coates’s mythology is the fact that colonial enterprise, in what would become the United States, relied first on European indentured servants, most of whom died within a handful of years after arriving on the continent. It’s Coates’s reading of race as sin that pushes him to imagine quasi-salvation in the fantasy of apocalypse. In this racial fatalism, reparations for slavery emerges as the anticipation of the inevitable Judgement Day. It is therefore no surprise that Coates has taken up racial reparations as his cross to bear, not to change the world, but to condemn it. \*\*\* For the better part of two years, Ta-Nehisi Coates has been the most visible and combative supporter of reparations in politics. Coates calls reparations “the indispensable tool against white supremacy.” In 2016’s “[My President Was Black](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/01/my-president-was-black/508793/)” and “[Better Is Good](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/ta-nehisi-coates-obama-transcript-ii/511133/),” Coates refers to the “moral logic” of reparations. They are a measure that could atone for what he called in 2014’s “[The Case for Reparations](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/),” the “sin of national plunder.” There he claimed that the nation owes a “moral debt” that must be remedied by the “spiritual renewal” that reparations would facilitate. Reparations for slavery is Coates’s ontological pivot fully realized. These days, we find Coates touring prestigious universities and making his case for reparations in keynote addresses to packed auditoriums. “I think every single one of these universities needs to make reparations,” Coates [said](http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/3/5/conference-encourages-slavery-reparations/) to thunderous applause at a March 3 conference at Harvard University. The day-long conference, “Universities and Slavery: Bound By History,” began with Harvard’s president admitting that the university “was directly complicit in slavery from the college’s earliest days in the 17th century.” Coates pushed the university to “use the language of reparation,” as a measure that would “acknowledge that something was done.” Though Harvard acknowledged its history, no race-specific remedy was forthcoming. Last fall, Georgetown did Harvard one better. They not only used the language of reparations, the school also put forward a program of financial and symbolic atonement. The university [admitted](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/us/intent-on-a-reckoning-with-georgetowns-slavery-stained-past.html) to selling slaves in 1838, “a transaction that helped save Georgetown from financial ruin.” In 2015 Georgetown [convened a commission](http://slavery.georgetown.edu/report/) to “reflect upon our University’s history and involvement in the institution of slavery.” The commission recommended granting preferential admission for descendants of the 272 slaves the university sold two centuries ago, in addition to gestures like changing the names of campus buildings from those of slavemasters to those of slaves and free people of color. Georgetown’s example is the closest actualization of reparations policy that has taken place during Coates’s three years of evangelizing. Coates [said of the plan](https://twitter.com/tanehisicoates/status/771378780988252161?lang=en), “folks may not like the word ‘reparations,’ but it’s what Georgetown did. Scope is debatable. But it’s reparations.” Coates wants “special acknowledgment” from above, in the service of spiritual renewal — which explains his penchant for means-tested trickle-down anti-racism. But if he had faith in the masses, as Fannie Lou Hamer did, he’d see that the renewal and acknowledgement he seeks comes from below, from class solidarity in the struggle for universal emancipation. Harvard has a $37 billion endowment. Mere months before Coates’s appearance, dining workers at the school were locked in a protracted battle for a living wage. Many of these workers are themselves descendants of slaves, but the university was unmoved by their struggle. The dining workers spent the better part of a month [on strike](https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/10/18/why-are-harvard-dining-hall-workers-strike/azkvOnNlU9DHwiFv6GcZsO/story.html), before finally [forcing Harvard](https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/10/26/striking-harvard-workers-got-everything-they-wanted-says-union/OtLJHHoWcdXeiHbKi1WPIN/story.html) to concede to their demands. The university was quicker to take the less expensive measure of admitting that the school was complicit in 17th century slavery than it was to pay its workers fairly today. I’m a former staffer for UNITE HERE, a hospitality union. Last year, I worked on a campaign in a multiethnic, multiracial university cafeteria in Chicago. The campaign’s primary demands were for wage increases and healthcare, using the slogan “Dignity and a Doctor.” Negotiations with the subcontractor had stalled, and strike preparations were under way. Pressures ran high. Workers were afraid. However, just as stories catalyzed resistance for Civil Rights leaders, stories anchored the worker organizing in our campaign. Though workers’ struggles with poverty wages and a lack of health coverage were crucial, one story stood out above the others. Workers continually shared stories that their Chinese colleagues were being abused for speaking Chinese on the shop floor. Managers would walk past, and upon hearing Chinese, they’d smack the speaker on the back of the head commanding the worker to “speak English!” Most of the workers were people of color, but the majority were not Chinese. The largest plurality in the workplace was made up of African-Americans, virtually all of whom only spoke English. But everyone could identify with the indignity of the story, the asymmetrical relations that empowered the bosses to abuse any one of them for any reason. Workers from a whole range of identities fought in solidarity with the Chinese workers. Discrimination on the basis of language became a central demand in the broader campaign. The campaign attached the specificity of the Chinese workers’ situation to all the workers’ common struggle against the boss. It was class struggle; not enough to overcome racism the world over, but a brief glimpse of solidarity across backgrounds and experiences, through acknowledging the shared indignity of class exploitation. In the end, the workers won. As the campaign victories were listed, the excitement in the room was overwhelming, a type of energy that I’d only ever felt at a particularly intense church service or while attending a high-stakes game in a packed stadium. The organizer announced that healthcare had been won. We clapped. We celebrated as the wage increases were added up. But when the organizer revealed that the contract guaranteed the right to speak non-English languages in the workplace, the room erupted. The Black workers were palpably just as invested as the Chinese workers, and everyone was ecstatic. Because he fails to deeply consider the real, material resistance of the masses, the kind that guided Fannie Lou Hamer, Coates idealizes racism. He evokes metaphors of earthquakes and physical laws to describe its magnitude. But for the workers in that university cafeteria, racism was a smack from a boss. For millions of poor Black people, racism is the corrosive water pipes poisoning their bodies. School closures, crumbling and unstable housing, and all the intimately practical things necessary for everyday life are the measure of racism. These racist realities are not separable from questions of class. In fact, they are expressions of class politics. The racialized tragedies faced daily by the masses require us to embrace class struggle, not Coates’s demobilizing metaphysical maxims about how white people “must ultimately stop themselves.” Solidarity from below, between cafeteria workers, truck drivers, secretaries, and any number of everyday people is worth magnitudes more than special acknowledgement from elites. This solidarity through shared struggle, as Fannie Lou Hamer recognized, is the foundation for social transformation. Where Coates would have us retreat, she called on us to march. She knew that the only way to defeat racism was to fight it, every step of the way.

#### Social death theory is wrong---conflates the oppressors’ view with the truth of black of existence, which re-centers the slave owner’s perspective and prevents struggles for re-humanization.

George **Lipsitz 17**. Professor of Black Studies and Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. 2017. “What is this Black in the Black Radical Tradition?” in Futures of Black Radicalism, ed. by Johnson and Lubin, 2017. p. 108-110.

Three miracles seem to characterize the history of Black people in the United States. The very survival of Black people in the face of murderous brutality and genocidal intent qualifies as a miracle. The enduring reality of Black humanity in a society that has used every means at its disposal to destroy Black dignity and deny Black people the opportunity to exercise their full humanity appears miraculous. The historical record of democratic aspiration and achievement by Black people, of creating democratic opportunities for themselves and extending them to others, seems to defy normal rational explanations. Despite the social death at the center of the slave system and the organized abandonments of today's neoliberal capitalism, despite beatings, lynchings, shootings, mass incarceration and systematic impoverishment, Black people have survived and thrived. In slavery, African people in the Americas owned virtually nothing, not even the skin on their backs. They had every reason to give in to despair. Yet they somehow managed to survive, to extend recognition and respect to each other while in bondage, and to maintain a commitment to the linked fate of all humans. Time and time again, Black people have countered vicious dehumanization with determined and successful re-humanization. Insisting on their own humanity and the humanity of all people, even that of their oppressors, they have been at the forefront of what Dr. King called “the bitter but beautiful struggle” for a more just and better world. From the egalitarian politics of abolition democracy in the wake of the Civil War and the participatory democracy of the civil rights movement to the contemporary insurgencies waged under the banners of #BlackLivesMatter and #SayHerName, struggles for Black survival and Black humanity have repeatedly linked the termination of existing racist policies to the creation of new democratic practices and institutions. Forced to cope with the nadir of political evil over centuries, Black people have responded consistently by forging advanced concepts of a deeply politicized love. Perhaps precisely because brutality and oppression can make people decidedly unlovable, African people in America have been adept at finding ways to perceive something left to love inside themselves and in others. That ability has enabled their survival, the preservation of their humanity, and their emergence as the nation's foremost champions of democracy and social justice. The people who were systematically denied access to the fruits and benefits of democratic citizenship and social membership turned out to be the people who valued democracy the most and who did the most to extend it to others. [END PAGE 108] Cedric Robinson has demonstrated that the three miracles were not really miracles at all, but rather products of a collective intelligence developed over generations of struggle. In Black Marxism, Robinson defines the Black Radical Tradition as “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve the collective being, the ontological totality.”1 Thus in many ways, the greatest achievement of the Black community was itself, its emergence as an aggrieved and insurgent polity committed to social justice. The “Black” in the Black Radical Tradition is a politics rather than a pigment, a culture rather than a color. Yet this Blackness does not presume a unified homogenous community with only one set of interests, needs, and desires. On the contrary, Robinson's research reveals that the key building blocks for Black survival, Black humanity, and Black democracy came from the lower rungs of Black society, from the plantations and slave quarters, out of the contradictions of the rural regimes of slavery and debt peonage and the living conditions in ghettos of northern and western cities. Experience taught the Black poor and the Black working class that racial capitalism entailed “an unacceptable standard of human conduct”2 that they needed to counter with a politics that was “inventive rather than imitative, communitarian rather than individualistic, democratic rather than republican, Afro-Christian rather than secular and materialist.”3 Robinson's emphasis on political struggle as the main explanation for Black survival, humanity, and democracy reminds us not to confuse the grandiose aspirations and illusions of the powerful with the actual lived experiences of those they control. Slavery did mandate legally and militarily supported social death, but slaves worked assiduously and effectively each day, every day, each year, and every year to create a rich social life.4 As Robinson argues, “Slavery gave the lie to its own conceit: one could not create a perfect system of oppression and exploitation.”5 Domination produces resistance, and resistance plants the seeds of a new society within the shell of the old. As Robinson explains in Black Movements in America, "The resistances to slavery were the [END PAGE 109] principal grounds for the radically alternative political culture that coalesced in the Black communities of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the era of revolutionary, liberal and nationalist impulses among Europeans in North America.” 6 Declaring Blacks to be less than human could not make them so, even in the eyes of their oppressors. Research by John Blassingame, George Rawick, Sterling Stuckey, Herbert Gutman, and Stephanie Camp (among others) reveals how slaves fused African retention and New World invention to forge a culture that affirmed their humanity and the humanity of others.7 They recognized this common humanity through multicultural, multiracial alliances with poor whites and others in maroon communities. 8 In colonial Louisiana, Blacks reached out to Native Americans for help in resisting slavery.9 Slave owners, however, were less successful in preserving their own humanity. In order to maintain the illusion of complete control, they tortured, whipped, hanged, burned, and dismembered their "property" when it displayed signs of having human will.10 Black people witnessed white people's inhumanity and pitied them. As early as the 1820s, David Walker argued that while whites lost the moral capacity to perceive the evil they enacted, they nonetheless knew "in their hearts" that Blacks were human. He argued that it was precisely this recognition that propelled their cruelty and brutality: they presumed that Blacks resented them and, if given the opportunity, would do to whites what whites had done to Blacks.11 In his history of the New Orleans slave market, Walter Johnson notes a similar loss of humanity among slave owners. Whites invested more than money in the slave system; they looked to it to elevate them beyond the status of ordinary mortals and became outraged when their chattel refused to conform to the roles they had been assigned. Johnson notes: The greater the transformative hopes slaveholders took with them to the slave market, the more violent their reactions to the inevitable disappointment of their efforts to get real slaves to act like imagined ones ... If they had to, they would use brutality to close the distance between the roles they imagined for themselves and the failings of the slaves they bought as props for their performance. 12 [END PAGE 110]

#### No permutations – they have to defend the end point of the political stance the aff took on the nature of oppression – if we have a link to their method of analysis you vote neg

Young, Professor emeritus of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 6

(Iris Marion, Responsibility and Global Justice, sites.coloradocollege.edu/engaging-the-global/files/2013/01/Young\_2006.pdf)

So far, I have offered only a way of thinking about responsibility in general. One might well object that the social connection model of responsibility raises as many questions as it answers. For example, the model says that all who participate by their actions in processes that produce injustice share responsibility for its remedy. Does this mean that all par- ticipants bear responsibility in the same way and to the same degree? If not, then what are the grounds for differentiating kinds and degrees of responsibility? Most of us participate in many structural processes, more- over, that arguably have disadvantaging, harmful, or unjust consequences for others. It is asking too much to expect most of us to work actively to restructure each and every one of the structural injustices for which we arguably share responsibility. How, then, should we reason about the best ways to use our limited time, resources, and creative energy to respond to structural injustice? Adequately responding to questions like these would take at least another full essay. Thus, I will only sketch answers here, and illustrate the responses once again through the example of the anti-sweatshop movement. Some moral theorists argue that responsibility names a form of obli- gationdistinctfromduty.JoelFeinberg,forexample,distinguishesbetween an ethic that focuses on obligation or duty and an ethic that focuses on responsibility. On the one hand, a duty specifies a rule of action or delin- eates the substance of what actions count as performing the duty. A responsibility, on the other hand, while no less obligatory, is more open with regard to what counts as carrying it out.49 A person with responsibilities is obliged to attend to outcomes that the responsibilities call for, and to orient her actions in ways demonstrably intended to contribute to bringing about those outcomes. Because a person may face many moral demands on her actions, and because changes in circumstances are often unpredictable, just how a person goes about discharging her responsibilities is a matter subject to considerable discretion.5° Given that a combination of responsibilities may be overly demanding, and given that agents have discretion in how they choose to discharge their responsibilities, it is reasonable to say that it is up to each agent to decide what she can and should do under the circumstances, and how she should order her moral priorities. Others have the right to question and criticize our decisions and actions, however, especially when we depend on one another to perform effective collective action. Part of what it means to be responsible on the social connection model is to be accountable to others with whom one shares responsibility—accountable for what one has decided to do and for which structural injustices one has chosen to address. When an agent is able to give an account of what she has done, and why, in terms of shared responsibilities for structural injustice, then others usually ought to accept her decision and the way she sets priorities for her actions. These considerations begin to provide an answer to the question I stated above, namel how should one reason about the best way to use one’s limited time and resources to respond to structural injustices? In a world with many and deep structural injustices, most of us, in principle, share more responsibility than we can reasonably be expected to discharge.5’ Thus, we must make choices about where our action can be most useful or which injustices we regard as most urgent. While a social connection model of responsibility will not give us a list of maxims or imperatives, it should offer some parameters for reasoning to guide our decisions and actions. These parameters, in turn, address the other ques tion I raised earlier—the question about kinds and degrees of responsibility. Different agents plausibly have different kinds of responsibilities in relation to particular issues of justice, and some arguably have a greater degree of responsibility than others.

#### Vibes are is communicative capitalism---its false assertion of political action dilutes the alternative into an affective rather than organized from of praxis

Abraham Iqbal **Kahn 16**, Ph.D., Professor of communication at U of South Florida, “A rant good for business: Communicative capitalism and the capture of anti-racist resistance,” *Popular Communication: The International Journal of Media and Culture*, Volume 14.1

The problem with neoliberalism is not that it asks us to be anti-racist as such, but that it demonizes collective action, occludes class consciousness, and forestalls the formation of plausible solidarities. The critical move that connects anti-racism to anti-capitalism is to account for the mechanisms that help anti-racism depoliticize the marketplace. Opposing neoliberalism requires attention to what Jodi Dean calls communicative capitalism, an enticement to play politics without doing it, to delight in political speech without the work involved in organizing and forming coalitions. As Dean (2009) puts it, communicative capitalism is defined by “the materialization of ideals of inclusion and participation in information, entertainment, and communication technologies in ways that capture resistance and intensify global capitalism” (p. 2). Marxist critics like Adolph Reed (2013) worry that the hunt for institutional racism works to “graft more complex social dynamics onto a simplistic and frequently psychologically inflected racism/anti-racism political ontology” (p. 12). Reed’s concern is that anti-racism centers oppositional politics around the wrong antagonism by promoting the racial diversification of capital. At the same time, anti-racist critics of neoliberalism notice the ways in which those very same complex social dynamics are deeply racialized. The idea of communicative capitalism resolves this impasse in oppositional politics by recognizing that legitimation and obfuscation are opposite sides of the same coin. By promising universal access and unfettered mobility, communication technologies deliver participation to previously excluded social groups and then register the fact of participation as politics itself. Anti-racist grievances are easily heard, but also quickly evaporate. Participation validates market wisdom and effaces the market’s racial effects. This point addresses the gap between racism as it was diagnosed and racism as it was practiced in the aftermath of Sherman’s postgame rant. A handful of hateful tweets offered the sports media the opportunity to exhibit their anti-racist credentials in torrents of self-referential speech. The sheer amount of media attention paid to Sherman after his postgame interview was itself the subject of media attention, a kind of meta-attention expressed in the suggestion that Sherman had “broken the internet.”1 Dean (2009) observes that on the internet, “media circulate and extend information about an issue or event, amplifying its affect and seemingly its significance. This amplification draws in more media, more commentary, and more opinion, more parody and comic relief, more attachment to communicative capitalism’s information and entertainment networks such that the knot of feedback and enjoyment itself operates as (and in place of) the political issue or event” (p. 32). Sports media illustrated this dynamic relative to the way audiences were invited to interpret Sherman’s rant. As Tommy Tomlinson (2014) admitted in Forbes, “raw emotion—whatever form it takes—is exactly what I hope for.” ThinkProgress’s Travis Waldron (2014) agreed that “it might be a little unfair to expect anything else than raw, honest emotion right after that game is finished.” Beyond simply circulating a burst of anti-racist indignation, this commentary distilled Sherman’s display into pure affect. Dean (2009) contends that communicative capitalism “reformats” political energy “to speaking and saying and exposing and explaining, a reduction key to a democracy conceived of in terms of discussion and deliberation” (p. 32). This kind of discourse produces the illusion that something political is going on, while “reinforcing the hold of neoliberalism’s technological infrastructure” (Dean, 2009, p. 32). This is not to say that racist epithets are undeserving of rebuttal, but that the disproportionate response performs neoliberalism’s injunction to reduce politics to “dialogue” and “awareness.” ESPN’s Ian O’Connor interviewed Sherman for an article one week after the NFC championship game. Insisting that “Richard Sherman did us all a favor,” O’Connor (2014) argued that “by raging against the stereotype of the black athlete, he encouraged a helpful discourse on the language of race in sports. And by informing those who wouldn’t guess otherwise that he’s really a nerd, at heart, with a Stanford degree, Sherman showed kids in Compton, Calif., and other American cities like it that they should never let anyone hang a low ceiling over their dreams.” At a basic rhetorical level, O’Connor illustrates how the definition of a “helpful discourse” about race requires the associated fantasy of social mobility that sustains neoliberal hegemony. O’Connor asked Sherman if “he felt he’d inspired a healthy conversation about the language of black and white in sports.” Sherman’s reply animated the fantasy through an unmistakable cultural trope: “I think it did have some effect on opening up the channels of communication and conversation and dialogue […] I want people to understand that everybody should be judged by their character, and who they are as a person, and not by the color of their skin.” The echo of Martin Luther King in this context evokes the idea that the barrier impeding the path out of America’s iconic ghetto assumes the form of race as such, located in a culture of race, distorting colorblind judgment. Colorblindness, of course, here tells its paradigmatic lie, but “when communication serves as the key category of left politics, whether communication be configured as discussion, spectacle, or publicity, this politics ensures its political failure in advance: doing is reduced to talking, to contributing to the media environment” (Dean, 2009, p. 32). However “helpful,” O’Connor’s line of reasoning misses the investment that anti-racism makes in dialogue as such. Put differently, Richard Sherman is good for the dialogue business. Deadspin revealed a lively conversation about thug-ness, but their failure to provide any meaningful context to the 625 televised utterances of “thug” subordinated the content of any argument to the ongoing accumulation of contributions. Sherman’s defenders were quick to discredit Twitter as both inimical to meaningful dialogue and inclined to abet racist expression. Despite Twitter’s insipid work as a “dry brush,” said Paola Boivin (2014) of the Arizona Republic, “the sheer volume of discussion catapults the story into a stratosphere that suggests greater importance.” The discussion, in other words, alerts us to itself. Twitter may trivialize and oversimplify but it also activates a determination to drown racist talk in an ocean of conversation. Zirin placed Sherman’s intervention into the historical context that marks the horizon of race politics in sport. Regarding Sherman’s hypothesis that “thug” is a stand-in for “the n-word,” Zirin (2014b) said, “Richard Sherman said something that has needed to be said since Jack Johnson commented that he would be Jim Jeffries’s ‘master’ a mere 40 years after the end of slavery […] It has needed to be said since Muhammad Ali said, ‘I don’t have to be what you want me to be.’” The comparison was meant to reveal Sherman’s “ability to use words as weapons and spit arguments as easily as he spits insults. That makes him interesting. That makes him provocative. That makes him dangerous” (Zirin, 2014b). Even if “danger” here refers to a multicultural platitude about colorblindness, Sherman is said to have resonated within a furious political buzz. Dean sees somewhat less disruptive potential. She claims that the transformation of messages into contributions is homologous to the distinction between use value and exchange value in capitalism (Dean, 2009, p. 27). Messages are oriented to the understanding, whereas contributions are oriented to circulation, their value derived from their movement through the communication network, where only “the popularity, the penetration and duration of a contribution, marks its acceptance or success” (Dean, 2009, p. 27). Decodings of “thug” traveled through the “rapidly moving and changing flow of content” as contributions carrying the exchange value required for our attention, interest, and energy (Dean, 2009, p. 28).

#### Trusting black women as a political strategy fails given that you will inevitably receive contradictory advice from black women who disagree with each other. This is because identity doesn’t guarantee radical interests, but privilege doesn’t necessarily make us clueless. Use debate as a space to build substantive political opinions.

RL Stephens 14, Chicago-based organizer for DSA, “My Skinfolk Ain’t All Kinfolk: The Left’s Problem with Identity Politics,” http://www.orchestratedpulse.com/2014/03/problem-identity-politics

Imperial America, murderous America, the America that abused and robbed countries like Bolivia —that America was me. I too was a settler; my Black feet were stained red with blood as I stood on stolen indigenous land. I too benefitted from colonialism, capitalism, and the other facets of White supremacy. I could no longer simply point the finger at White people. My marginalized identity didn’t absolve me. I began to think systemically. I had to actually develop a multidimensional worldview and take political stances that drew on more than my lived experiences. When I returned to the United States and became involved in leftist politics, I soon realized that the political scene was, unfortunately, still stuck on personal identity. WHAT IS IDENTITY POLITICS? In this age of (misinterpreted) intersectionality, our politics tend to rely on the body. When we deal with race, White people embody White supremacy and privilege, while non-Whites are the corporal manifestation of resistance. We obsess over White privilege and how we can get more people of color involved in our spaces and projects, but does White supremacy really disappear when there are no White people in the room? Some people look at these flaws and call for an end to “identity politics”, but I think that’s a mistake. At its most basic level, identity politics merely means political activity that caters to the interests of a particular social group. In a certain sense, all politics are identity politics. However, it’s one thing to intentionally form a group around articulated interests; it’s another matter entirely when group membership is socially imposed. Personal identities are socially defined through a combination of systemic rewards/marginalization plus actual and/or potential violence. We can’t build politics from that foundation because these socially imposed identities don’t necessarily tell us anything about someone’s political interests. Successful identity politics requires shared interests, not shared personal identities. I’m not here to tell you that personal identity doesn’t matter; we rightfully point out that systemic power shapes people’s lives. Simply put, my message is that personal identity is not the only thing that matters. We spend so much energy labeling people—privileged/marginalized, oppressor/oppressed—that we often neglect to build spaces that antagonize the systems that cause our collective trauma. All You Blacks Want All the Same Things We assume that if a person is systemically marginalized, then they must have a vested interest in dismantling that system. Yet, that’s not always the case. Take Orville Lloyd Douglas, who last summer wrote an article in the Guardian in which he admitted that he hates being Black. I can honestly say I hate being a black male… I just don’t fit into a neat category of the stereotypical views people have of black men. I hate rap music, I hate most sports, and I like listening to rock music… I have nothing in common with the archetypes about the black male… I resent being compared to young black males (or young people of any race) who are lazy, not disciplined, or delinquent. Orville Lloyd Douglas, Why I Hate Being a Black Man As we can see from Douglas’ cry for help, membership in a marginalized group is no guarantee that a person can understand and effectively combat systemic oppression. Yet, we seem to treat all marginalized voices as equal, as if they are all insightful, as if there is no diversity of thought, as if—in the case of race– “All you Blacks want all the same things”. Shared identity does not equal shared interests. John Ridley, the Oscar-winning screenplay writer of 12 Years a Slave, is a good example. He’s written screenplays based on Jimi Hendrix, the L.A. riots, and other poignant moments and icons within Black history. He wants to see more Black people in Hollywood and he has a long history of successfully incorporating Black and Brown characters into comic book stories and franchises. However, in 2006, Ridley made waves with an essay in which he castigated Black people who did not live up to his standards; saying, “It’s time for ascended blacks to wish niggers good luck.” So I say this: It’s time for ascended blacks to wish niggers good luck. Just as whites may be concerned with the good of all citizens but don’t travel their days worrying specifically about the well-being of hillbillies from Appalachia, we need to send niggers on their way. We need to start extolling the most virtuous of ourselves. It is time to celebrate the New Black Americans—those who have sealed the Deal, who aren’t beholden to liberal indulgence any more than they are to the disdain of the hard Right. It is time to praise blacks who are merely undeniable in their individuality and exemplary in their levels of achievement. The Manifesto of Ascendancy for the Modern American Nigger While Ridley and I share cultural affinity, and we both want to see Black people doing well, shared cultural affinity and common identity are not enough– which recent history makes abundantly clear. Barack Obama continues to deport record numbers of Brown immigrants here at home, while mercilessly bombing Brown folks abroad. Don Lemon, speaking in support of Bill O’Reilly, said that racism would be lessened if Black people pulled up their pants and stopped littering. Last fall, 40% of Black U.S. Americans supported airstrikes against Syria. My skinfolk ain’t all kinfolk, and the Left needs to catch up. NO MORE ALLIES John Ridley, Barack Obama, myself, and Don Lemon are all Black males. We also have conflicting political positions and interests, but how can we decide which paths are valid if we only pay attention to personal identity? Instead of learning to recognize how the overarching systems maintain their power and then attacking those tools, we spend our energy finding an “other” to embody the systemic marginalization and legitimize our spaces and ideals. In some interracial spaces I feel like nothing more than an interchangeable token whose only purpose is to legitimize the politics of my White peers. If not me, then some other Black person would fill the slot. We use these “others” as authorities on various issues, and we use concepts like “privilege” to ensure that people stay in their lanes. People of color are the authorities on race, while LGBTQ people are the authorities on gender and sexuality, and so forth and so on. Yet, experience is not the same as expertise, and privilege doesn’t automatically make you clueless. As I’ve discussed, these groups are not oriented around a singular set of political ideals and practices. Furthermore, as we see in Andrea Smith’s work, there are often competing interests within these groups. We mistake essentialism for intersectionality as we look for the ideal subjects to embody the various forms of oppression; true intersectionality is a description of systemic power, not a call for diversity. If we don’t develop any substantive analysis of systemic power, then it’s impossible to know what our interests are, and aligning with one another according to shared interests is out of the question. In this climate all that remains is the ally, which requires no real knowledge or political effort, only the willingness to appear supportive of an “other”. We can’t build power that way. After having gathered to oppose organized White supremacy at the University of North Carolina, a group of organizers in Durham, North Carolina found that the Left’s emphasis on personal identity and allyship was a major reason why their efforts collapsed. They proposed that we adopt the practice of forming alliances rather than identifying allies. (h/t NinjaBikeSlut) Much of the discourse around being an ally seems to presume a relationship of one-sided support, with one person or group following another’s leadership. While there are certainly times where this makes sense, it is misleading to use the term ally to describe this relationship. In an alliance, the two parties support each other while maintaining their own self-determination and autonomy, and are bound together not by the relationship of leader and follower but by a shared goal. In other words, one cannot actually be the ally of a group or individual with whom one has no political affinity – and this means that one cannot be an ally to an entire demographic group, like people of color, who do not share a singular cohesive political or personal desire. The Divorce of Thought From Deed While it’s vital for me to learn the politics and history of marginalized experiences that differ from my own, listen to their voices, and respect their spaces and contributions — it’s also important for me to understand the ways in which these same systems have shaped my own identity/history as well. Since we know that oppression is systemic and multidimensional, then I’m going to have to step outside of personal experience and begin to develop political ideals and practices that actually antagonize those systems. I have to understand and articulate my interests, which will allow me to operate from a position of strength and form political alliances that advance those interests– interests which speak to issues beyond just my own immediate experience. Ultimately, I want to attack power, not people

#### The alternative entails constructing a collective ideology against capitalism--- anything else supports the system by giving coherence to the hegemony of individualism

Susana Narotsky 16, Barcelona professor, “On waging the ideological war: Against the hegemony of form”, Anthropological Theory 2016, Vol. 16, 263–284)

The problem of structure is, then, political: how to yield power, and to what end. The possibility of defining a project which is a pre-conception that designs a different structure (of connecting relationships) is alien to the new ‘philosophy of the event’ that I have described above. Therefore, the meaning of politics can only emerge from the contingent connections that create possible worlds and simultaneously enact them. In this approach, political innovation and creativity emerge in a similar way to the Austrian school’s conception in which the market – an arena of multiple singular events – helps unveil the knowledge that each individual creates in the spark of the exchange moment. This view, I suggest, expresses an epistemological and political ideology which mirrors the phenomenal form of capitalist relations. For the Austrian school, interference from a structured (i.e. planned) economic project (e.g. a social state project, cf. the socialist side of the socialist calculation debate) is anathema to the permanent discovery that the market enables. Likewise, interference from a political project (e.g. a conceived design of differently structured relationships) is anathema to the new politics of emergence. See, for example, the following quote: The extraordinary energy of attraction and aggregation revealed by the WSF9 [World Social Forum] resides precisely in refusing the idea of a general theory. The diversity that finds a haven in it is free from the fear of being cannibalized by false universalisms or false single strategies propounded by any general theory. The time we live in, whose recent past was dominated by the idea of a general theory, is perhaps a time of transition that may be defined in the following way: we have no need of a general theory, but still need a general theory on the impossibility of a general theory. (Santos, 2004a: 341, emphasis added) Conclusion: Waging the ideological war Maybe I am pushing the analogy too far here. However, I suggest that this similarity in form is an expression of the consolidation of the neoliberal hegemony. Indeed it points to the difficulty of daring to conceive of and propose a coherent project of a different world that would provide tools to end the destruction, dispossession and devaluation of life that affects the great majority of people all over the world (as opposed to creating a mirage of myriad possible worlds waging partial and concrete struggles). Capitalism is a modern totalitarian reality that presents itself as the highest expression of individual freedom. The liberal ideology of creative interaction resulting from the unplanned decisions of individual unconnected wills supports in fact a coherent and totalitarian project based on relations of depredation, dispossession and exploitation, sustained by regulated privilege and geared to capital and power accumulation in the hands of a few (humans). Therefore a counter-hegemonic force can only be created from a different formal framework, one that does not rest on the Austrian market model of creative discovery. I think we still need a unitary structure that can break down the hegemony of form that limits our present-day struggles. We need an integrated theory that connects concrete, singular, struggles to a whole and might provide a structured understanding of the world we live in. While many radical political economy scholars are repeatedly doing this in their analysis, the post-structural model dominates present-day oppositional politics. As I have addressed elsewhere (Narotzky, 2014), this results from histories of past betrayals and totalitarian enactments of grand theories which make resentment and caution legitimate. We need, however, to overcome a handicap that we don’t own. Different knowledges (or singularities) coming from different histories and cultural understandings need to be valued equally (equality) in their own terms (difference) but especially in terms of their potentiality to produce a structured, coherent, and powerful alternative that makes sense in a connected world. We are struggling against an enemy that has as its strongest weapon a hegemony that pervades our lives to the core in the West and increasingly all over the world. Admittedly, it is possible that the creative imagination of an alternative society will come from spaces not yet totally subsumed to capitalism that exist everywhere (Williams, 1977). But in order to accomplish durable change this vision needs to become an ideology of sorts where the many feel represented and willing to act. This ideology should be able to explain the experiences that most people have in their various forms of existence all over the world, and be able to propose an alternative that makes sense to the many all over the world. Indeed, in order to rehabilitate ideology as an oppositional instrument we need to pay attention to what people are doing and saying, and here the ‘sociology of absences’ (Santos, 2004a) and the emphasis on ‘knowledges otherwise’ (Escobar, 2007) is crucial to overcome the ~~blindness~~ {problems} that a hegemonic project has created. But we also need the courage to make connections and create logical paths, proposing a general theory of how social relations are governed and how they should be challenged and transformed. I am referring here to what Eric Wolf defined as ‘structural power’: ‘Structural power shapes the social field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while making others less possible or impossible’ (1990: 587). At a level of signification we need to produce conceptual order which will create a differentmapping of what ‘sociologies’ should be made ‘absent’ (new ‘sociologies of absence’). We should be willing to draw a different selection of what connections count and what forms of knowledge we require in order to challenge the present structures of power. This, I suggest, is the ideology that we are at present unable to produce. At present, the only integrated alternative ‘oppositional’ ideologies are being mostly provided by religions and nationalisms. Ramon and Juan say they repudiate ‘ideology’ as an instrument of struggle for ‘tactical’ reasons. Left ideologies as entrenched in the discourses of governing parties (social-democratic parties) and classic trade unions are useless because they do not express the present-day injuries of capitalism. On the one hand, the ideology of the Left has been recurrently subverted and discredited by the actions of those who achieved power under that banner. On the other hand, the injured masses have changed and their real lives have subverted the classical Left labour/capital centred model of structural relations. While the classic wage relationship (lack of ownership of means of production and hence exploitation of labour) is still widely spread in most parts of the world, other forms of dispossession (e.g. financial rent extraction), dependency (petty commodity production, bonded labour) and abandonment (absolute surplus population) are growing. Therefore the old explanatory model does not make sense any longer in the present situation, and the attached transformative project has been repeatedly discredited by the parties’ practice. A return to the real world is necessary. What Ramon and Juan see as a ‘tactical’ move away from old models in order to better represent the experiences of the majority needs, however, to be reframed in a coherent framework that is able to challenge the logics of capitalism. The ethnographic position of listening to the variously injured voices and their practical proposals does not exempt us from the responsibility to propose a different overall model of a better society and to believe that, at a particular historical conjuncture, the dominant model needs to be challenged by a unified force. This can only be achieved by the construction of a theory that relates the parts to a whole in a way that makes sense to the many and is capable of confronting the model of reality that is deeply entrenched in a hegemonic (Austrian market) form. To propose the need of such an integrated theory and its political expression as an oppositional ideology does not imply considering all struggles homogeneous; this would be unreasonable as we know that capitalism expresses itself unevenly. Neither does it imply that the theory or its constitutive elements (concepts, logical connections, analyses) will not be challenged; as the world changes they will and should be permanently put into question. But this is a war, and we need a powerful weapon which can match the neoliberal hegemony of form. In the non-secular realms many models exist that directly (often violently) struggle for hegemony in different parts of the world. It is the secular realm (historically a product of the Enlightenment, and hence of the same liberal movement that supported the expansion of capitalism and socialism) that seems to be unable to produce an emancipatory model that subverts the neoliberal hegemony entrenched after the failure of the socialist experiments. Some models are incipient. One is the illiberal model of a hierarchical status society (an organic solidarity of the corporatist kind), which harmonizes difference by taming privilege through patronage and creating strong exclusionary borders and discarded people at the margins. This struggle to push oneself into the space of recognition by cultivating patronage networks (Ferguson, 2013) or by recurrently banning access to other claimants (Kalb, 2011; Holmes, 2000) is very different from the one seeking to destroy enclosures on the basis that ‘another world is possible’. In the latter category, the World Social Forum (WSF) model, which extends the liberal form to the struggles against capitalism, refuses to produce a unified social project and supports a fragmented, partial and often inconsistent confrontation with the totalitarian forces of capital, a problem that is recognized by one of its more lucid advocates: ‘The other characteristic of transnational sub-politics, a negative one, is that, so far, theories of separation have prevailed over theories of union among the great variety of existing movements, campaigns and initiatives’ (Santos, 2001: 191). A model such as that of the WSF is commendable because it refuses to institute a dominant form of knowledge and the unique authority of a universal social model (Santos, 2004a: 341) in the face of a hegemonic model that normalizes oppression and exploitation. However, its strength is also its weakness. Instead, I propose that in order to transform the dominant political economic structure in such a way that capitalist forms of accumulation are destroyed and substituted by a human economy (Hart et al., 2010), it is necessary to have the courage of an oppositional ideology that can become a counter-hegemony benefiting the many.